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About Warwick Business School 
Global Energy Research Network
This report has been published with the kind 
support of the Warwick Business School (WBS) 
Global Energy Research Network.
Part of the University of Warwick’s Global Research 
Priority on Energy, the WBS Global Energy Research 
Network seeks to increase the University’s research 
capacity by exploring the new global frameworks 
that will enable companies and countries to meet 
future demands for affordable and sustainable 
energy while achieving their goals for economic 
growth and development.
Global Energy research arises from Warwick 
Business School’s long-standing interest in 
understanding the role of business when society 
faces major challenges. We combine fundamental 
research into management practices with a topical 
view on their implications for businesses, policy 
and society.
Our research aims to address two key questions:
• How are the evolving economic forces and new 
patterns of economic growth across the world 
leading to changes in industry structures, new 
business models and changes in management 
practices across the energy sector?
• What is the evolving relationship between the 
industry and governments through policy-
making, regulation, international relations and 
global frameworks?
As part of our research we work with a wide range 
of stakeholders, including business organisations, 
regulators, governments, charities and NGOs 
and welcome approaches from organisations 
and groups who wish to support or learn more 
about our research. To find out more contact:       
michael.bradshaw@wbs.ac.uk
About ESRC Impact Acceleration
This report has been published with the kind 
support of Impact Acceleration Account (IAA) 
funding from the Economic & Social Research 
Council (ESRC), grant reference ES/M500434/1.
IAAs are institutional awards that have been 
introduced to deliver funding mechanisms for 
social science knowledge exchange and impact 
activities at a local, research organisation, level.
Natural gas production in the UK peaked in 2000, 
and in 2004 it became a net importer. A decade 
later and the UK now imports about half of the 
natural gas that it consumes. The central thesis 
of the project on which this report is based is that 
as the UK’s gas import dependence has grown, it 
has effectively been ‘globalising’ its gas security; 
consequently UK consumers are increasingly 
exposed to events in global gas markets.
Given the nature of the UK’s gas balance, two 
arenas are of particular significance: developments 
in the Northwest European gas market (and the 
broader EU strategy of gas market integration) and 
developments in the global Liquified Natural Gas 
(LNG) market. This report takes an interdisciplinary 
perspective, which marries energy security insights 
from politics and international relations, with 
detailed empirical understanding from energy 
studies and perspectives from economic geography 
that emphasise the spatial distribution of actors, 
networks and resource flows that comprise the 
global gas industry.
This report is divided into three sections. The first 
section reports on the development of a supply 
chain approach to global gas security; the second 
section reports on the findings of three case 
studies; and the final section deploys the supply 
chain approach to assess the challenges to UK gas 
security. The report concludes by considering the 
policy implications of our research and identifies 
areas for further research and monitoring. 
The supply chain approach addresses the 
shortcomings of the current energy security 
literature that we consider to be fourfold: first, it 
tends to be too abstract and fails to engage with 
the specific charateristics of natural gas; second, 
it assumes that oil and gas are the same when it 
comes to assessing energy security; third, it is too 
state-centric and tends to ignore the crucial role of 
companies and other stakeholders involved in the 
gas markets; and fourth, it is overly concerned with 
upstream physical security of supply.
The supply chain approach addresses these failings 
by linking upstream concerns about security of 
supply to midstream issues relating to security of 
transportation (transit), processing and storage, 
and downstream concerns about security of gas 
demand.
Three case studies form the core of this project. 
They represent important issues that are likely 
to influence UK gas security over the short- to 
medium-term (5-15 years). The first case study 
examines the impact of US shale gas and considers 
both upstream security of supply impacts and 
downstream impacts. The case study reveals 
that without a single molecule of shale gas being 
exported from North America, the pace and scale 
of the US shale gas revolution is already having a 
significant impact on global gas markets.
The analysis identifies five stages over the past 
decade: first, the rapid increase in shale gas 
production in the US; second, the resulting 
loss of the US as a major destination for LNG 
imports; third, the redirection of US-bound LNG 
to European markets (in large part the UK) where 
it has increased competition, promoted hub-
based trading and reduced the market share of 
Russian gas firm Gazprom; fourth, the subsequent 
re-routing of LNG away from Europe to Asian 
markets (principally Japan after the Fukushima 
nuclear incident); and fifth, most recently, the 
displacement of natural gas in Europe by cheaper 
coal imports – much of which has come from the 
US where coal consumption has fallen due to gas 
gaining market share in power generation.
The second case study looks at the UK’s LNG 
supply chain and considers both upstream supply 
issues and midstream infrastructure issues. 
It was chosen because the expansion of LNG 
imports is one of the most significant aspects of 
the UK’s newfound import dependence. The case 
study deploys a global production network (GPN) 
approach to examine the key networks and actors 
that shape and control the flow of LNG into the UK.
Executive Summary
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The research demonstrates how physical 
infrastructure for LNG supply has been developed 
in the UK. This infrastructure re-positions the UK 
with respect to established international trade in 
natural gas, extending the reach and diversity of 
UK gas supply beyond the North Sea and European 
continent to the Atlantic Basin and Middle East. It 
further shows how this infrastructure is embedded 
within international supply chains in ways that are 
significant for the security of supply.
The UK’s LNG supply is dominated by Qatar, which 
means it is subject to the ‘optimising’ behaviour of 
Qatar Petroleum which places cargoes to ensure 
maximum income to the Qatari state. After an 
initial wave of supplies prompted by the loss of the 
US market, at present, only a modest amount of 
LNG is coming to the UK because of the surge in 
demand in Asia. However, there is the possibility 
that by the early 2020s there might be an over-
supply of LNG and in such circumstances the UK is 
well placed to attract increased supplies. Whether 
or not it does so will depend on the price of gas on 
the European market.
The third case study explores the patterns of 
ownership and control over the European pipeline 
network. The research highlights the increasingly 
influential background role of the EU, in addition 
to the new layering of institutional actors as a 
result of expanding state regulation throughout 
the supply chain and the increasing concentration 
of power within a limited set of corporate bodies. 
At the same time, the nature of gas trading in the 
EU is moving away from long-term oil indexed 
contracts toward hub-based trading.
At present, the UK has its own hub – the National 
Balancing Point (NBP) – but as market integration 
gathers pace the UK gas market will increasingly 
be drawn into a larger Northwest European 
market. Thus, as the UK’s domestic gas production 
continues to decline, it will be critical that we 
assess the implications of the evolution of a single 
European gas market for UK gas security.
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the associated 
gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine has once 
again heightened concern within the EU about its 
dependence on Russia. Although the UK does not 
directly import substantial amounts of Russian 
gas, Gazprom’s trading activities in Europe are 
orchestrated from London and much of the gas 
that comes to the UK via the interconnectors is 
backfilled with supplies to Northwest Europe from 
Russia (largely through Nordstream).
In the light of the current situation in Ukraine, 
the European Commission and National Grid have 
conducted various stress tests to assess the likely 
impact of a shut down of Russian gas supplies for a 
prolonged period of time. These studies support the 
view that the UK has a resilient upstream supply 
situation and that, subject to market conditions, 
could draw additional supplies from Norway and 
the global LNG market. However, the latter would 
require a higher domestic gas price to attract LNG 
cargoes away from Asia. At the same time, the 
liberalised nature of the UK gas market means that 
in a gas supply emergency UK gas might flow to 
Europe if prices attracted it. Russia has reached an 
agreement to supply Ukraine through the winter of 
2014/15, but in the longer term, the current crisis 
will have a lasting impact on European gas supply 
and demand.
The final substantive section of this report uses 
the supply chain approach to assess the UK’s gas 
security. In the upstream there is the need for a 
more critical assessment of the future prospects 
of Norwegian gas supplies. There is a tendency to 
take the availability of Norwegian gas for granted, 
but as existing fields decline and the geography 
of production changes, so the accessibility of 
supplies will change and this may draw the UK 
into accessing Norwegian gas via the continental 
European market. 
4In recent years, the prospect of a UK shale gas 
revolution has been heralded as the solution to 
our security of supply concerns. However, given 
the current status of shale gas exploration, it is 
unlikely that domestic shale gas production will be 
a factor until the early 2020s and it is also unlikely 
to be of sufficient scale to significantly reduce the 
UK’s import dependence or to have a significant 
impact on UK gas prices. In the midstream the 
focus is upon the need to ensure that the National 
Transmission System (NTS) is able to respond as 
the role of gas changes from base load to a back 
up for renewable intermittency. At the same time, 
should there be significant shale gas production 
this will require local connections to the NTS and 
may change the patterns of flow within the system.
The issue of gas storage remains the most 
controversial issue in the midstream. The UK only 
has 4.6 bcm of gas storage and total consumption 
in 2013 78 bcm. This is low by comparison with 
some other northern European countries that use 
significant amounts of gas. Planning approvals 
have been granted for a significant increase in 
storage capacity, but the industry maintains 
that there is no business case to invest and the 
current Government is adamant that it will not 
intervene. The unwillingness to invest in additional 
storage is symptomatic of a bigger problem in 
the downstream and that is the high level of 
uncertainty surrounding future gas demand in the 
UK.
The Government recognises the problem in its 
Gas Generation Strategy. The Electricity Market 
Reform capacity market is designed to ensure 
that sufficient new gas-fired generation is built; 
however, at present, existing Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) stations are being mothballed and 
nobody is committing to new investment. This 
is a concern because if other areas of the UK’s 
energy strategy are delayed (new nuclear) or fail to 
deliver (efficiency and demand reduction), then the 
UK may need more gas for longer than currently 
anticipated. As the Gas Generation Strategy 
illustrates, gas-fired power is also likely to be 
required to help balance an increasingly complex 
decarbonised electricity system, even if our legally 
binding emissions targets are met.
There is no doubting that UK gas security is now 
intimately linked to developments in both the 
European and global gas markets and that there is 
great uncertainty in both. Thus, what is required 
is a policy of ‘gas by design’ that plans now for the 
changing role of gas in the UK energy mix, thus 
ensuring future UK gas security.
UKERC Research Report
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This was always an ambitious project, but events 
in the global gas industry have made it all the 
more challenging. The original project proposal 
was submitted just days after the Great East Japan 
earthquake and the disaster at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant; and the project 
came to a conclusion just as the EU revisited 
its concerns about dependence on Russian gas 
imports in the light of Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea. In between, the full significance of North 
American fossil abundance became apparent, 
as did related concerns about the impact of 
the cost of the low carbon energy transition on 
European economic competitiveness. In the UK, 
the possibility of domestic shale gas production 
has become a contentious issue, though there 
is very little prospect of significant commercial 
production until the 2020s. In all sorts of ways, 
these events have proved our central thesis that 
UK policy makers need to pay much greater 
attention to international developments, because 
in a globalising gas market events as far away as 
in Japan can have a major impact on how the UK 
sources its gas imports.
Just as there has been considerable movement 
in global gas markets during the project, the 
researchers themselves have all changed 
institutions. The project has been coordinated 
by Mike Bradshaw who started the project as 
Professor of Human Geography at the University 
of Leicester and ended it as Professor of Global 
Energy at Warwick Business School; the LNG 
elements of the project have been led by Gavin 
Bridge, who started the project at Manchester 
and ended it as Professor of Economic Geography 
at the University of Durham; the European gas 
pipeline governance elements of the project 
were led by Stefan Bouzarovski who started the 
project at Birmingham and ended it as Professor of 
Geography at Manchester; and finally, Jim Watson, 
who served as a consultant on the project, started 
it as Director of the Sussex Energy Group and 
ended it as Research Director at the UK Energy 
Research Director. The project’s Research Assistant, 
Joseph Dutton is now a reporter on European 
Natural Gas with Argus Media.
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Natural gas production on the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) peaked in 2000, and in 2004 the 
UK1 became a net importer. Since then the UK’s 
import dependence has grown rapidly and in 2013 
indigenous production was sufficient to meet only 
half of the UK’s gas demand (DECC 20014). Thus, 
in less than a decade the UK has gone from being 
a net exporter of gas to importing half of its needs, 
and projections suggest that the level of import 
dependence will continue to increase unless there 
is a significant increase in indigenous production 
and/or a reduction in demand.
This report is based on the findings of a 
programme of research funded by UKERC Phase II,
titled “The Geopolitical Economy of Global Gas 
Security and Governance: Implications for the UK”. 
The central thesis of the project is that as the UK’s 
gas import dependence has grown it has effectively 
been ‘globalising’ its gas security as UK consumers 
are increasingly exposed to events in global gas 
markets. The initial project had three aims: first, to 
develop a conceptual framework and methodology 
to analyse global gas security and governance; 
second, to identify the geopolitical drivers, actors, 
issues and risks shaping global gas security to 
the late 2020s; and, third, to assess the wider 
implications of our research findings for the UK’s 
energy strategy and low carbon transition policy.
The project has been realised through five 
objectives, which were revised and became more 
focused as the research progressed:
• To develop a supply chain approach to global 
gas security
• To analyse the impact of US shale gas on UK 
gas security
• To analyse the development of the UK LNG 
supply chain
• To analyse the governance and control of the 
European pipeline network
• To assess the implications of our findings for 
UK energy strategy
1 Although the term UK is used in this report, the focus of the project has been on 
GB; however, given that Northern Ireland is entirely dependent on GB for supplies 
of natural gas, the security challenges do relate to the wider UK. Furthermore, given 
that the Republic of Ireland obtains over 90 per cent of its natural gas from GB via 
two interconnectors, the project’s findings have implications for the entire island.
UKERC Research Report
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The project also benefitted greatly from a 
partnership with the Gas Programme at the Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies (OIES), and Professor 
Jonathan Stern and Howard Rogers have provided 
numerous valuable insights and a reality check 
when needed. 
The project was divided into three phases. The 
first phase developed the supply chain approach. 
The second phase was organised around the 
completion of the three case studies. The final 
phase involved a consideration of the implications 
of our research findings for UK energy policy. The 
report employs the same structure as the project. 
After an initial examination of the changing status 
of UK gas security, the supply chain approach is 
presented. The following section reports on each 
of the three case studies. The final substantive 
section deploys the supply chain approach to 
assess the current status of UK gas security. The 
report concludes by considering the wider policy 
implications of our research.
The aim of this report is to present our work to a 
wide audience, during the project we organised two 
conferences, including a two-day conference last 
November on the ‘UK’s Global Gas Challenge’ that 
was organised by The Meeting Place. The project 
has also contributed to UKERC’s Flagship Project on 
Global Energy (Ekins and Watson 2014) and to the 
forthcoming book Global Energy: Issues, Potentials 
and Policy Implications, which will be published by 
Oxford University Press in 2014 (Ekins et al. 2014). 
Further academic articles are also in preparation 
and this report draws on all this material.
2
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The story of the rise and fall of UK natural gas 
production is now familiar (this section draws on 
Bradshaw 2012). Prior to the discovery of natural 
gas offshore on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), 
gas in the UK was produced from coal and was 
known as ‘town gas.’  Offshore production of 
natural gas began in July 1967 and by 1972 it 
exceeded the supply of town gas. 
In the 1970s and 1980s there was a nationwide 
conversion programme and expansion of the 
natural gas pipeline network and gas consumption 
grew rapidly in households and industry (a 
similar process of natural gas replacing town gas 
took place in Northern Ireland after the subsea 
interconnector from Scotland was commissioned 
in 1996).  However, it was not until 1991 that it 
was permitted to use natural gas to generate 
electricity. The development of the Combined Cycle 
Gas Turbine (CCGT), combined with an abundant 
supply of natural gas from the North Sea, spurred 
a ‘dash for gas’ as gas power generation replaced 
coal- and oil-fired capacity (See Figure 1). 
In 1970 coal accounted for 47.1 per cent of total 
primary energy consumption in the UK and gas 
5.4 per cent, by 2010 the roles had reversed as coal 
had fallen to 14.8 per cent and gas had increased 
its share to 42.7 per cent. In recent years, the slow 
down of the economy has dampened demand for 
gas and there has been a relative resurgence in the 
role of coal in UK power generation at the expense 
of natural gas. Finally, the growth of renewable 
power generation is also impacting on gas demand.
In the UK natural gas consumption is divided 
fairly evenly between three sectors: power 
generation, industry and households. It is therefore 
important not to overstate the influence of the 
power generation sector on future gas demand. 
On an annual basis, the seasonality of natural gas 
demand is a result of its dominant role in space 
heating and UK gas demand is susceptible to 
significant year-on-year variation due to weather. 
At present, the gas industry in the UK must deal 
with a continuing decline in UKCS production and 
demand destruction from cheap coal and growing 
renewable generation. 
Figure 1. UK Natural Gas Trends 1990-2012
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The UK’s Gas Balance
The UK has a well-developed infrastructure that 
enables both the import and export of natural gas. 
The National Transmission System (NTS), that is 
owned and operated by National Grid, connects to 
pipelines that supply gas from both the UKCS and 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) and there 
is one interconnector to Northern Ireland and two 
interconnectors that supply gas to Ireland (the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are 93 
per cent dependent on Great Britain for their gas 
supply). The Corrib gas field that is being developed 
by Shell offshore of the west coast of Ireland 
should come online in late 2014, after much delay. 
This could reduce Ireland’s import dependence 
by as much as 30 per cent. DECC (2014) figures 
suggest that exports to the Republic of Ireland 
were 4.9 bcm (gas accounted for 49 per cent of 
power generation in Ireland in 2012). Longer term, 
further development of Ireland’s offshore potential 
could change its role as an importer of UK gas. 
At present, the interconnectors have no physical 
reverse flow capacity. 
There are two interconnectors to the continental 
European gas market. The Balgzand-Bacton 
Line (BBL) from the Netherlands that opened in 
December 2006 and has a capacity of 19.5 bcm 
and the Interconnector UK (IUK) from Belgium 
that started operations in 1998, a two-way pipeline 
with an import capacity to the UK of up to 26.9 
bcm, or export capacity of up to 20bcm to Belgium 
(IEA 2014). Both pipelines provide physical flows 
from the continent to the UK, but only the IUK is 
physically reversible enabling gas to be exported 
from the UK to Europe. As a result of this capability, 
the UK has continued to export gas to Europe even 
as domestic production has declined.
As discussed below, in recent years there has been 
a substantial investment in LNG import capacity 
in the UK and there are now three operating LNG 
terminals: Isle of Grain in Essex (capacity 21 bcm) 
and South Hook LNG (capacity 21 bcm) and Dragon 
LNG (capacity 6 bcm) at Milford Haven in Wales. 
According to DECC and Ofgem’s Statutory Security 
of Supply Report (2013), the UK has 54 bcm/y 
of import capacity from pipelines connecting 
to Norway; 46 bcm/y from capacity connected 
to continental Europe and 53 bcm/y from LNG 
terminals (this includes the Teesside Gasport that 
is not currently operational). This means that the 
UK total import capacity is 153 bcm, according to 
BP (2014) data; in 2013 total UK gas consumption 
was 73.1 bcm. This suggests a sizeable capacity 
margin. However, there has been considerable 
variation in the load on that capacity and some 
elements of the infrastructure seem more prone to 
technical failure. 
The final component in the UK’s gas balance is 
storage, both in dedicated storage facilities and at 
LNG terminals. There are two types of dedicated 
storage: seasonal storage that is filled in summer 
(when gas is cheaper) and withdrawn when prices 
are higher in the winter (though the spread has 
declined, which has undermined the commercial 
case for investment in additional storage capacity). 
The Rough storage facility, which is a depleted 
offshore gas field, is an example of such storage. 
The other type of storage is fast-cycle storage that 
can be filled and refilled throughout the year in 
response to short-term market conditions. The UK 
currently has less than 5 bcm of storage capacity 
(DECC 2010) and the question as to whether or not 
the UK has sufficient storage and storage of the 
right kind is raised later in this report.
Table 1 shows the changing scale and geography 
of UK gas imports since 2000. The infrastructure 
described above supports three distinct ‘vectors’: 
pipeline imports from Norway, pipeline imports 
from continental Europe and LNG imports. The 
gas flows quantified here demonstrate how 
over a short period of time the UK has become 
increasingly drawn into both the continental 
European gas market and global LNG trade. In 
fact, the UK’s gas security has been dominated 
by two trading relationships: pipeline gas from 
Norway and LNG from Qatar (see Table 1). More 
recently, Norwegian gas has re-established itself as 
the dominant source of supply. The reason for the 
decline in UK LNG imports is discussed later.
Gas imports via the two interconnectors are 
reported as coming from either the Netherlands 
(BBL) – which is a significant gas producer – or 
Belgium (IUK), which is not. There is no way of 
knowing where exactly that gas originated from, 
but it is back filled by imports from Norway, Russia 
and North Africa (Algeria and Libya). According to 
the European Commission (2014), in 2013 the EU 
imported 39 per cent of its gas by volume from 
Russia, 33 per cent from Norway and 22 per cent 
from North Africa. The vexed question of how 
much Russian gas the UK imports is difficult to 
answer. Gazprom’s own data show an increasing 
amount of gas being exported to the UK, from 3.8 
bcm in 2005 to an estimated 12.5 bcm in 2013; 
however, as Stern (2014) explains, most of this gas 
is exported from elsewhere rather than physically 
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sourced from Siberia as Gazprom actively trades on 
European markets (Gazprom Marketing & Trading 
is located in London). For example, Centrica signed 
a deal with Gazprom in 2012 to purchase 2.3 bcm 
of gas a year over a three-year period from late 
2014, but even it does not know where that gas will 
come from. In any event, it is safe to assume, for 
the moment at least, that the UK is not dependent 
to any degree on Russian gas imports. In fact, we 
would argue that UK gas security has benefited 
from the construction of Nord Steam (which 
delivers directly from Russia to Germany via a 
subsea pipeline through the Baltic Sea) as this has 
increased the liquidity of the NW European gas 
market (see section 4.3).
Interconnection means that the UK is not immune 
to the impact of disruptions of Russian gas 
supplies to continental Europe and previous events 
triggered price increases in the UK. However, 
the 2009 gas crisis resulted in UK storage being 
emptied to sell gas in continental Europe. This 
highlights the fact that even in a gas emergency 
in the UK, the flow of gas is determined by the 
UKERC Research Report
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Table 1. The Geography of UK Gas Imports: 2000-2013 (Million Cubic Metres)
Year
Pipeline Imports Liquefied Natural Gas Imports Total Gas 
Imports
Import 
Dependence
Belgium Netherlands Norway Qatar Total LNG
2000 270 - 1,031 - - 1,301 1.4
2001 367 - 1,158 - - 1,525 1.7
2002 611 - 3,392 - - 4,003 3.9
2003 401 - 6,327 - - 6,728 5.3
2004 2,339 - 8,460 - - 10,799 9.1
2005 2,203 - 11,305 - 500 14,008 11.5
2006 2,788 840 14,003 71 3,442 21,073 17.2
2007 593 7,107 20,339 247 1,403 29,442 27.8
2008 1,127 8,440 25,528 - 820 35,915 34.3
2009 728 6,475 23,478 5,627 10,127 40,808 37.3
2010 1,245 8,164 25,026 14,565 18,578 53,012 47.6
2011 368 6,447 21,203 21,153 24,827 52,846 55.0
2012 1,310 7,297 26,832 13,335 13,667 49,105 56.4
2013 3,307 7,804 27,866 8,607 9,278 48,225 57.8
% Total Imports 
in 2013
6.9 16.2 57.7 17.8 19.2 100 n/a
The import dependence data are from National Grid and show the percentage of domestic 
demand that is met from imports. Note that the National Grid data report a higher level of 
import dependence than DECC, this maybe because they do not account for gas exports. 
Source: Data from DECC 2014 and National Grid 2014a
price of gas in the UK relative to continental hub 
prices. For an assessment of the coming winter see 
National Grid’s (2014b) winter outlook.
While the existing physical infrastructure clearly 
enables gas imports from a variety of sources, 
which is rightly considered a source of resilience; 
the open nature of the UK gas market means that 
it is exposed changes in both the NW European 
gas market and the global LNG market. Here it 
is useful to distinguish, as DECC (2012) does in 
its Energy Security Strategy, between physical 
security of supply and price security of supply.  
The diversity of the UK’s gas balance suggests 
that physical security of supply should not be a 
challenge – though there is always the possibility 
of short-term technical disruptions – it is price 
security that presents the challenge. In short, the 
key question is will the UK gas market be able to 
attract sufficient gas to the UK at a price that is 
acceptable to UK consumers? The domestic UK gas 
price is determined by the National Balancing Point 
(NBP) and results from gas-to-gas competition 
in Europe’s most liquid market (Heather 2010). 
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The NBP reflects UK market conditions, but that 
market is increasingly connected to markets in 
NW Europe, and in competition with other trading 
hubs, such as the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in 
the Netherlands (Petrovich 2013). As a result of the 
EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Package, there 
are major changes underway in European gas 
markets that will be accelerated by current events 
in Ukraine and that will have a significant impact 
on the status of the NBP and the way that gas is 
traded in the UK.
This research project paid particular attention to 
the development of the UK’s LNG supply chain 
because it was new and increasingly significant. 
We did not examine the UK’s relationship with 
Norway in any detail. Just as the UK’s production 
has peaked and declined, so Norwegian production 
will inevitably fall. As existing fields decline, new 
production may not be in such close proximity to 
the UK and may require greater involvement in 
the NW European market to attract Norwegian 
gas. The rise of hub-based trading in NW Europe 
and Statoil’s shift in favour of hub-based contracts 
will mean that in the future the destination of 
Norwegian gas will be determined by wider market 
conditions in NW Europe. Equally, if Norwegian 
production on the continental shelf were to decline 
more quickly than anticipated, this would require 
higher imports into the UK via the interconnectors, 
which would most likely originate in Russia. This 
suggests that a critical evaluation of the UK’s 
dependence on Norwegian gas would be timely.
In sum, we would agree with DECC/OFGEM (2013, 
8) in their assessment of gas security:
“ Great Britain has the most liquid and one of the largest gas markets in Europe with extensive import infrastructure and a diverse range of gas supply sources. GB is therefore 
well placed to manage gas supply risks. 
In 2012, around half of UK gas demand was 
supplied through UK production, and GB’s import 
infrastructure has increased five-fold over the 
past decade, reflecting the predicted decline from 
domestic sources. As a result, GB has increased the 
diversity of supply sources and routes to market, 
and if necessary, could meet nearly double (189 
per cent) its annual demand from imports alone. 
This flexibility means that if there is a problem 
with one source there are other sources to fall back 
on. It also allows gas suppliers to source gas from 
wherever is cheapest. Currently, GB can obtain 
gas from North Sea producers, via pipelines from 
Norway and the rest of Europe, via shipments of 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from further afield, or 
from gas storage.”
However, a more integrated approach is required 
to identify the key actors and interactions that 
govern the gas supply chain from upstream 
security of supply to downstream security of 
demand. Furthermore, there are limits and costs 
to the flexibility of supply that is described above 
and these need to be better understood. This is 
the purpose of our supply chain approach to gas 
security.
3
A Supply Chain Approach to 
Global Gas Security
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This project develops a geopolitical economy 
approach to global gas security. This approach 
marries insights from politics and international 
relations in relation to energy security, to the 
detailed empirical understanding that can be 
found in energy studies – that is represented by 
the exemplary research of the Gas Programme 
at OIES – and the concerns of geography with 
the territoriality of energy infrastructures and 
the spatiality of actors, networks and flows that 
comprise the global gas industry. 
The Failings of Existing Research
We have developed a supply chain approach to 
address the shortcomings of the energy security 
literature that we consider to be fourfold: first; the 
literature is often too abstract and fails to take 
account of the material specificities of natural gas 
production and trade. Because natural gas is a high 
volume, low value commodity and is difficult and 
costly to transport, there is no global gas market, 
but a complex network of interconnected regional 
and national markets, with different structures for 
pipeline and LNG trade (Stevens 2010). The nature 
of price discovery and contracting in natural gas 
is also far more complex than the oil sector (for 
an extensive analysis of pricing of internationally 
traded gas see Stern 2012). Second, as a result of 
the first failing, the literature tends to assume 
that oil and gas are the same when it comes 
to assessing energy security (in support of this 
criticism, see Shaffer 2013). A third failing is that 
the analysis of energy security tends to be too 
state-centric and pays insufficient attention to the 
role of companies and other stakeholders involved 
in gas governance. Though, it does seem the 
case that governments are more involved in the 
gas industry than other energy sectors, with the 
exception of nuclear power, and this has much to 
do with the capital intensity of the infrastructure 
and reliance on inflexible pipeline networks to 
transport gas and deliver it to consumers. In 
many cases states own or control national gas 
companies, but international trade in natural gas 
is largely orchestrated by companies and through 
market structures. It is not states that trade with 
one another, but companies through market 
structures that are regulated by states and other 
bodies such as the European Union. The fact that 
the trade data are reported by state means that 
it is all too easy to ignore the complex network of 
actors that participates in that trade. This project 
has sought to populate those networks with the 
companies involved in securing natural gas for   
the UK.
A final failing of the literature is that it is overly 
concerned with upstream security of supply as 
the major challenge to gas security. Furthermore, 
there is too much concern with the geopolitical 
manipulation of natural gas trade to support the 
foreign policy goals of exporting countries.  This 
is not to down play the significance of geopolitics 
in Russian gas trade with Europe, but the fact is 
that the vast majority of disruptions to supply are 
technical in nature (Skea et al. 2012). For example, 
the most significant supply disruptions in the UK 
have come from the 2006 fire at the Rough storage 
facility and the Elgin gas leak in March 2012.
A Supply Chain Approach
An appreciation of the nature of the natural gas 
supply chain provides the starting point for our 
analysis. Figure 2 presents a simplified version of 
the natural gas supply chain, which also links the 
key stages in the supply chain – the upstream, 
midstream and downstream – with the energy 
security concerns of: security of supply, security of 
transportation (transit) and security of demand.
From a gas governance perspective, the supply 
chain approach also provides a framework for 
identifying the various actors and interactions that 
enable the material flow of gas from the wellhead 
to the consumer, be that industry, households 
or power generators. We would argue that for 
gas-importing countries an understanding of 
the multi-scalar and transnational nature of the 
supply chain is essential to assessing gas security. 
Furthermore, many of the measures that can be 
taken to improve the resilience of the supply chain 
are located in the midstream and downstream in 
the domestic market where national regulators 
and policy makers can make a difference, rather 
than in the upstream that is largely beyond the 
influence of gas importing countries (the EU’s Third 
Package is just such a response). 
Table 2 provides a generic framework to link the 
material and technical elements of the supply 
chain and the various dimensions and issues that 
influence gas security at both an international and 
national scale.  At the global scale upstream issues 
relate to access to reserves and the availability of 
investment and technology to provide sufficient 
production to meet global demand (see Bradshaw 
et al. 2014a). It should be remembered that the 
majority of natural gas is still consumed within the 
country where it is produced. In 2013 only 30.6 per 
cent of global gas production was internationally 
traded and of that 68.6 per cent was as pipeline gas 
and 31.4 per cent as LNG (BP 2014a).
Table 2. A Supply Chain Approach to Gas Security
Energy Security Dimensions Issues
U
p
st
re
am Security
of
Supply
• Resource Base
• Technology
• Investment
• Extent of proven reserves
• Access to reserves for investors
• Access to investment to develop proven reserves
• Availability with existing technology and prevailing price
M
id
st
re
am Security
of
Transport
(Transit)
• Processing
• Transportation
• Storage
• Processing of associated gases
• Pipeline network
• Compressor stations
• Liquefaction facilities
• LNG Shipping
• Regasification facilities
• Storage
• Interconnectors
D
ow
n
st
re
am
Security
of
Demand
• Power generation
• Industrial use
• Domestic use
• Transport
• Role of gas in the energy mix
• Price formation 
• Price competitiveness
• Contract structure
• Energy policy 
• Carbon tax/Cap & Trade
• Carbon Capture & Storage
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Figure 2. The Natural Gas Supply Chain
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For gas importing states security of supply issues 
relate to securing reliable access to gas at a price 
that is affordable to domestic customers. Issues in 
the midstream relate the processing, transporting 
and distributing natural gas. 
Shaffer (2013) has conducted an analysis of the 
factors that affect the stability of supply of natural 
gas between states and concluded that: ‘projects 
involving transit states are inherently less stable 
than those that are direct between supplier and 
consumer.’ The analysis also shows that states 
‘usually curtail exports of gas when it entails 
shortages at home.’ The issue of transit states is 
clearly a major concern for EU gas security, but the 
proposed ‘Southern Corridor’ will traverse more 
state boundaries than current Russian export 
pipelines, suggesting that it will do little to improve 
transit security. The analysis also demonstrates 
the logic of Gazprom constructing the Nordstream 
pipeline to Germany. In the downstream, concern 
is for security of demand. At a global scale this is 
a concern for gas-exporting countries that wish 
to receive a fair price for their resources and the 
certainty that there will be sufficient a market 
to warrant investing in production and export 
infrastructure.
The traditional LNG investment model requires 
that investors sign contacts with future customers 
often before they reach a final investment 
decision. Historically, this has served to constrain 
the construction of liquefaction capacity. Within 
national gas markets the concerns here relate to 
a sufficiency of demand to warrant investment 
in the midstream infrastructure and in power 
generating capacity. It should also be noted that 
for technical reasons the loss of domestic gas 
supply is much harder to recover from than an 
electricity outage. Stevens (2013) reports that in 
the early 1980s British Gas estimated that if the 
gas supply to Birmingham were cut off, it would 
take three years to reconnect all customers. This 
is because a gas engineer is required to reconnect 
each gas-burning appliance.  Thus, a loss of supply 
to domestic customers is to be avoided at all 
costs. For this reason, many states use demand 
management – such as duel fuel contracts with 
large industrial customers and fuel switching in 
the power generation sector – to reduce demand 
when faced with a gas supply emergency. There is 
not the space here to consider all these issues in 
any detail; a later section of the report deploys the 
supply chain approach to assess the issues that are 
currently influencing UK gas security.
 
4
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Three case studies form the core of this project. 
They were chosen as representing significant 
issues that would influence UK gas security over 
the short- to medium term (5-15 years). The first 
case study on the impact of US shale gas on UK 
gas security deals with both upstream security 
of supply concerns and security of demand 
concerns; the second case study of the UK’s LNG 
supply chain considers both upstream supply 
issues and midstream infrastructure issues; the 
final case study on the governance and control 
of the European gas pipeline system focuses on 
a key issue that arises from the UK’s increased 
integration into the continental European gas 
market and also illustrates how issues in the 
midstream impact on gas security.
Each of the case studies develops its own 
conceptual approach: the shale gas case study 
employs a more traditional energy studies 
approach and stresses the connected and 
unpredictable consequences of the rapid expansion 
of domestic unconventional gas production in the 
US; the LNG case study uses the Global Production 
Network (GPN) approach to examine the key 
networks and actors that shape and control the 
flow of LNG into the UK; the final case uses social 
network mapping techniques to chart the patterns 
of ownership and control over the European 
pipeline network. 
4.1  The Impact of US Shale Gas on UK Gas 
Security
In less than a decade the United States (US) has 
gone from preparing for substantial LNG imports 
to planning for the development of LNG exports 
(this section draws on Bradshaw et al. 2014a). 
However, it is important to understand that the 
so-called ‘US Shale Gas Revolution’ has taken 
decades to develop. The industry in the US likes to 
proclaim the rapid development of unconventional 
oil and gas production as an exemplar of the role 
of small and medium-sized operators and the 
benefits of the free market system; but, this is only 
the recent part of the story and the reality is that 
the US Government played a key role in the 1970s 
and 1980s by supporting basic scientific research 
and the development of technologies for hydraulic 
fracturing, and also by providing tax incentives to 
promote development (Stevens 2012).
The key upstream technologies that facilitated 
the shale gas sector were a combination of those 
developed specifically for shale and others that 
were innovations for the oil and gas industry in 
general and subsequently applied to shale plays. A 
2001 National Research Council (2001) study listed 
the most significant technologies as horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, with 3D seismic 
imaging making a general contribution to the 
upstream sector. Both horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing are proven technologies in the 
conventional oil and gas industry. 
In the US it is commonplace to talk about high 
volume Hydraulic Fracturing (HVHF) in relation to 
shale gas to stress the high volumes of water used 
to produce shale gas. Mitchell Energy first drilled 
horizontal wells in the Barnett shale in Texas in 
1991, and following a period of drilling process 
improvement, falling upstream costs and rising 
domestic gas prices, the number of horizontally 
drilled production wells in the Barnett grew from 
just 1 in 2000 to 2,091 in 2008. Mitchell Energy also 
developed hydraulic fracturing methods in the 
Barnett shale with ‘frack zones’ up to 1,500 ft.
Devon Energy purchased Mitchell Energy in 
2002 and the rest is history as a combination of 
conditions in the US enabled the rapid diffusion 
and deployment of these technologies to develop 
shale gas production. It was not our aim to 
examine the US shale gas revolution in detail (see 
Trembath et al. 2012), instead we are concerned 
with impact that the rapid and dramatic change 
of fortunes in the US is having on the global gas 
industry and in particular on gas security in the UK 
and Europe.
Even without a single molecule of shale gas being 
exported by North America (to include Canada 
and Mexico), the pace and scale of the US shale 
gas revolution is already having a significant 
impact on global gas markets. In our analysis we 
have identified five stages over the past decade: 
first, the rapid increase in shale gas production 
in the US; second, the resulting loss of the US 
as a major destination for LNG imports; third, 
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the redirection of US-bound LNG to European 
markets (in large part the UK) where it increased 
competition, promoted hub-based trading and 
reduced Gazprom’s market share; fourth, post-
Fukushima, the subsequent re-routing of LNG 
away from Europe to Asian markets (principally 
Japan); and fifth, most recently, the displacement 
of natural gas in Europe by cheaper coal imports – 
much of which has come from the US where coal 
consumption has fallen due to gas gaining market 
share in power generation. 
However, the situation remains highly fluid and in 
2013-14 the US power sector switched back to coal 
as a cold winter forced up gas prices and in the EU 
both gas and coal lost out to growing renewable 
generation in the power sector (Rühl 2014). The low 
price of carbon on the European Trading System 
(ETS) is also part of the story, as it is not penalising 
the higher carbon content of coal. The return of 
coal to Europe is likely to be short lived as both 
the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and 
the Industrial Emissions Directive that will follow 
it will result in a large amount of coal-fired power 
generating capacity, and some oil and gas-fired 
capacity, having to close. The net result should be 
renewed demand for gas-fired power generation 
(some of which is currently mothballed), which in 
turn begs the question where will Europe source its 
gas from, should there be a recovery in demand?
Data for 2013 suggest that as LNG left Europe for 
Asia, Gazprom stepped into the gap and increased 
its market share (in the UK increased imports 
from Norway filled the gap). Gazprom’s increase 
in market share was also because it bowed to 
consumer pressure and agreed discounts within 
many of its long-term supply contracts (Mitrova 
2014). Most recently, the crisis in Ukraine has 
stiffened the EU’s resolve to reduce its dependence 
on Russian pipeline gas imports, but the harsh 
reality is that there is very little that can be done 
in the short-term and the longer-term options, 
such as the Southern Corridor and LNG imports 
from North America may prove to be just as 
insecure and/or more costly. It is also the case that 
European companies are locked into long-term 
supply contracts with Gazprom that last well into 
the 2020s and beyond (Stern 2014). Furthermore, 
there is significant variation between member 
states in terms of their reliance on Russian gas, 
with the Baltic States and southeast Europe 
being particularly vulnerable, and the latter are 
particularly exposed to transit disruptions in 
Ukraine.
There are hopes that domestic unconventional gas 
production in the EU may provide an alternative 
source of supply. The crisis in Ukraine may result 
in a more positive attitude towards shale gas 
development in the EU, particularly in Poland and 
the UK; and the Ukraine itself has significant shale 
gas potential, though investors such as Shell and 
Chevron are understandably nervous about the 
investment environment. In June 2014, Shell was 
forced to suspend drilling activities over concerns 
about the safety of its staff. The bottom line is 
that for all sorts of reasons we are not going to 
see an US-style shale gas revolution in Europe and 
significant commercial production is unlikely until 
the 2020s and possibly into the 2030s.
The National Grid’s (2014a) UK Future Energy 
Scenarios demonstrates both the high level of 
uncertainty and the degree of caution required 
in relation to future shale gas production in this 
UK. Their projections range from no successful 
production in their ‘No Progression’ Scenario to 
a peak of 32 bcm/year in the early 2030s in their 
‘Low Carbon Life’ scenario. Whatever the eventual 
outcome, the reality is that for the remainder of 
this decade Europe will be unable to reduce its 
reliance on Russian gas imports, especially as 
indigenous production continues to decline and 
the global LNG market remains tight. This is a 
situation that will become even more challenging 
should European (and UK) gas demand rebound 
and start to grow again.
The US shale gas revolution has already had a 
significant impact on the pricing of internationally 
traded gas, again without any physical export 
capacity (this section is based on Bradshaw et al. 
2014b). The pace and scale of change in the US is 
difficult to underestimate. A decade ago the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) was not 
reporting statistics on shale gas production and 
they were projecting that the US would account for 
23 per cent of the global LNG market by 2010 with 
imports in excess of 169 bcm (EIA 2005). Instead, 
domestic shale gas production grew from 11 bcm 
in 2005 to 226 bcm by 2011 and in 2012 it reached 
265 bcm – 39 per cent of all US gas production 
(EIA 2013a). According to the 2014 Annual Energy 
Outlook Reference Case, shale gas will account for 
53 per cent of total gas production in 2040 with 
production more than double its current level 
at 554 bcm (EIA 2014). This has had a dramatic 
impact on the utilisation of US LNG import 
infrastructure. 
In 2011 installed US LNG regasification capacity 
stood at 25 per cent of the country’s natural gas 
demand, but only 13 per cent of that capacity was 
utilised, falling to 3 per cent in 2012. As recently as 
2008 companies were still investing in LNG import 
terminals.
The North American gas market is currently an 
almost self-contained system where gas prices 
are determined by supply and demand. In recent 
years a combination of depressed demand due 
to economic recession and increased supply has 
resulted in falling prices for natural gas. The 
Henry-Hub wholesale price (the benchmark gas 
price in the US) fell from $12.69 per million British 
thermal unit (MMBtu) in June 2008 to a 10-year low 
of $1.82 MMBtu in April 2012. It rebounded to over 
$3.72 MMBtu in 2013 and increased in early 2014 as 
a result of the very cold winter. Nonetheless, prices 
are expected to remain historically low for some 
time to come.
The EIA (2014) has developed five scenarios for 
the Henry-Hub price through to 2040 and four of 
the five show the price still below $6.00 MMBtu 
in the late 2020s and the Reference Case suggests 
that the price will be below $8.00 MMBtu in 2040, 
well below the highs of late last decade. The price 
at present is so low that only gas production that 
benefits from associated natural gas liquids (so-
called wet gas) or that which is produced along 
with tight oil is profitable to produce on a full-cycle 
basis (i.e. all costs remunerated). A higher price 
is required for so-called ‘dry gas’ to come back 
into production. Here gas exports have a role to 
play, as they would allow production to increase 
because linking the North American market to 
global markets might increase domestic prices 
sufficiently to allow dry gas production to return.
Analysis of the impact of exports suggests that the 
resulting domestic price in the US would still be 
significantly lower than that paid in Europe and 
Asia, and would bring economic and balance-of-
payments gains to the US economy (Ebinger et al. 
2012). At present, the US government is considering 
43 applications for LNG export licences totalling 
304 mtpa of LNG (total LNG deliveries in 2013 were 
about 240mt), but only 6 have received approval 
to export to non-free trade agreement countries 
(which includes Japan and the EU) and four now 
have the necessary environmental approvals and 
one is under construction – Cherniere Energy’s 
Sabine Pass project. Three others now have the 
necessary approvals to start constructions: the 
Freeport LNG Development project, Cameron LNG 
and Cove Point LNG. A further fourteen projects are 
pending approval, with more expected.
The US Department of Energy recently changed 
the process to require environmental approvals 
ahead of requesting an export licence. This move 
aims to raise the costs of applying for approval 
to stop speculative applications and speed up 
approvals; even then many approved projects will 
fail on financial and/or environmental grounds. 
Most recently the US House of Representatives 
passed a Bill that would require the Department 
of Energy to reach a final decision on a proposal 
within the 30 days after the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has completed its 
environmental analysis of an LNG project. The Bill 
has yet to be approved by the US Senate, but the 
concern now is that further delays may mean that 
US LNG projects will fail to secure buyers in an 
increasingly competitive market.
There is a further 100 mtpa plus of projects being 
considered in Canada. Just how much new LNG 
export capacity will be built in North America is 
impossible to know, but already the possibility of 
exports linked to Henry-Hub prices is impacting on 
the global LNG market. Figure 3 shows the recent 
dynamics of gas prices in the key regional markets 
– the US, Europe (UK and Germany) and Japan. 
The Post-2009 divergence reflects the different 
market conditions (and price formation structures) 
prevalent in the US, Europe and Japan. As discussed 
above, the US price is by far the lowest resulting 
from gas-to-gas competition in a more or less 
self-contained market that is over-supplied.  Two 
European prices are shown, an average German 
import price that is dominated by the cost of oil-
indexed pipeline supplies from Russia and North 
Africa and the NBP price in the UK that is linked to 
European and global LNG prices.
The Japanese price is an average of the price paid 
for LNG deliveries that are dominated by crude 
oil-indexed, long-term contracts. The impact of 
Fukushima is clear to see with Japan having to 
access additional short-term LNG cargoes post 
March 2011.The share of LNG in Japanese power 
generation increased from 29.3 per cent in 2010 
to 42.5 per cent in 2012 (Okuya 2014); accordingly 
Japan’s LNG imports increased 24 per cent between 
2010 and 2012, reaching 119.0 bcm and falling 
slightly to 118.8 bcm in 2013 (BP 2014a). Imports 
have likely peaked for the moment as Japan’s gas 
power generation is now operating at full capacity 
and there is the possibility that some nuclear 
power capacity will come back online.
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Japan has had to pay a high price to attract the 
necessary gas to meet demand and in 2012 alone 
spent $68.98 billion on LNG imports making a 
major contribution to Japan’s trade deficit. In such 
a context, it is not surprising that Japanese utility 
companies (and other LNG consumers in Asia) 
see the prospect of Henry-Hub based supply as a 
means of reducing prices. The IEA’s Medium-Term 
Gas Market Report 2014 (IEA 2014) reports the 
gap between Asian and US gas prices as being $12 
MMBtu in 2013. The IEA talks of an ‘Asian price 
stalemate’ whereby Asian buyers no longer ready 
to pay record oil-linked prices are seeking more 
flexible contracts and pricing mechanisms.
To promote dialogue, the Japanese Government 
has hosted two LNG Producer-Consumer 
Conferences, with a third planned for November 
2014. The problem is that investors report that 
future additions to LNG supply are likely to be 
increasingly expensive. Thus, LNG exporters are 
looking for a higher price and Asia importers are 
looking for a lower price. The current standoff 
is a result of the perception that US Henry-Hub 
projects might offer a cheaper alternative to oil 
indexation (Rogers and Stern 2014), prospective 
North American projects are also seeking long-
term contracts to make them financially viable; 
but they are all selling capacity on a tolling basis 
with customers buying the option to use the 
liquefaction facility. This suggests, the US LNG 
will introduce a degree of flexibility into the LNG 
market that will have wide-reaching implications.  
As we move forward we will have four producing 
regions competing for the Asia LNG market: North 
America, Australia, Russia and East Africa. Thus, 
early next decade, there is the possibility of the 
current tight market being replaced by a significant 
supply-glut and lower LNG prices, but the number 
of projects reaching market will be constrained 
by the availability of firm buyers willing to sign 
contracts, unless there is an increased willingness 
for investors to build capacity aimed at the short-
term market. These developments, in turn, could 
have significant consequences for European (and 
UK) gas security.
Post-Fukushima, LNG imports in Europe (and the 
UK) have fallen dramatically as that LNG has 
been re-directed to Asia (see Table 2 and section 
4.2 for the case of the UK). This has not presented 
a supply threat to Europe or the UK because, as 
discussed earlier, gas demand has been falling and 
alterative supplies have come from Norway and 
Russia.
Figure 3. Trends in Regional Gas Prices: 1996-2013 ($MMBtu)
Source: BP 2014a
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However, should gas demand recover and once 
again LNG become available at competitive prices, 
there is more than sufficient LNG import capacity 
in the UK and elsewhere in Europe to realise this 
opportunity once again (some LNG did return 
to the UK in summer 2014, a result of weaker 
demand in Asia). It is all a matter of price. The 
question then is how might Gazprom respond to 
this renewed competition? Its initial response last 
time was to defend price, but then it lost market 
share and offered discounts to regain it. Geopolitics 
notwithstanding, should that happen again the 
winner here could be the European consumer who 
would be paying less for their gas.
Furthermore, the possibility of perceived renewed 
competition from LNG could further reduce 
the role of oil-price indexation in European gas 
markets.
In sum, the significance of the US shale gas 
revolution to date lies not so much in the material 
difference it has made to UK and European gas 
markets; but rather in the impact that is having 
on global energy markets, initially through the 
knock-on effects of the loss of the US LNG market 
and increased coal exports, through to the possible 
consequences of Henry-Hub price-based LNG 
exports in the future. This example makes clear 
the need for UK policy makers to keep abreast of 
developments in an increasingly interconnected 
global gas market, particularly in relation to both 
shale gas and LNG.
4.2  Following the Molecule: The UK’s LNG 
Supply Chain 
LNG is an established technology for handling 
and moving natural gas. Cooling natural gas to a 
liquid state reduces its volume 600-fold, making 
it economically possible to move gas beyond 
the limits of the pipeline network by road or 
ship. Ocean-borne LNG trade has doubled in the 
last decade and now accounts for a third of all 
internationally traded gas (BP 2014a). LNG enables 
gas producers to monetise historically ‘stranded’ 
gas reserves; creates opportunities for arbitrage 
between regional markets; and enables gas-
importing countries to diversify sources of supply. 
By mobilising gas beyond the continental limits of 
pipelines, LNG is creating a more geographically 
complex and interconnected gas market. 
Understanding how LNG is re-shaping global gas 
markets is particularly important for the UK, 
where gas is a major component of the fuel mix 
and import dependency is growing. Our analysis 
has outlined the geographical structures and 
Figure 4. Gas Production, Exports and LNG 
Compared (2013)
Source: Data from BP 2013
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25
trajectories of global LNG trade and examined how 
the UK’s LNG supply chain is organised. Our case 
study involved desk research in the UK, industry 
interviews and site visits in the UK and Qatar.
Expansion of Global LNG Trade
As noted previously, in comparison to oil, gas is 
geographically ‘sticky’: most of the gas produced 
worldwide is consumed in the country where 
it is produced, with only a third of global gas 
production internationally traded (Figure 4). 
Although this trade continues to be dominated by 
pipelines, as noted earlier, the volume of gas traded 
as LNG has doubled in the last decade. Historically, 
LNG has been a point-to-point trade structured 
by long-term contracts and, until the 1990s, was 
largely limited to flows into Japan and South Korea 
from SE Asia, and flows into Europe from North 
Africa. Trade in LNG has subsequently expanded 
in scale and become more complex in scope: the 
number of countries importing or exporting LNG 
has grown, Qatar has entered the market as a 
major new supplier eclipsing historic exporters 
(such as Indonesia and Algeria) in scale and reach, 
and extensive investment has been made in the 
infrastructure of LNG supply (liquefaction and 
regasification terminals, and tanker fleets). As the 
extent and intensity of LNG trade has grown it has 
eroded – although not replaced – the long-standing 
regional structure of LNG trade (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Worldwide LNG Trade, 2012
Figure 6. Contribution of LNG to UK Gas 
Imports and Consumption (2012)
Flows <0.5 MTPA not shown. Source: Data from IGU 2012
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The UK’s Position in Global LNG 
The UK has seen significant investment in its 
infrastructure for importing LNG and it has 
become an important part of the UK’s gas supply 
since 2005. In recent years LNG has accounted for 
between a third and a half of all imported gas so 
that, on average, LNG satisfies around a fifth of 
UK gas demand (Figure 6). The UK is now among 
the world’s most significant LNG importers, vying 
with Spain as Europe’s leading destination for LNG. 
The infrastructure developed in the UK over the 
last decade enables imports from a wide range of 
countries (including Trinidad, Algeria, Yemen and 
Norway) although since 2009 over 90 per cent of 
import volumes have originated from Qatar.
The UK has a deep and highly liquid gas market 
characterised by gas-on-gas competition. In such 
an environment LNG is essentially a ‘price-taker’. 
Most of the LNG coming to the UK is not tied into 
long-term contracts that require physical delivery 
into the UK market. In fact, the only ‘firm’ LNG 
contracted to the UK is the agreement between 
Centrica and Qatargas to deliver gas to the Isle 
of Grain terminal. A new contract was signed in 
November 2013 to supply 3 mtpa (4.13 bcma) of 
LNG over a four and half year period, and this built 
on an earlier contract signed in 2011.
The vast majority of LNG comes to the UK under 
contract terms that enable gas to be diverted in 
response to market conditions and, as a result, 
the rate at which LNG flows into the UK market 
largely depends on differences in price between 
here and elsewhere. Imports of LNG surged 20-fold 
to peak in the first half of 2011, as the UK absorbed 
LNG displaced by rapidly growing domestic gas 
production in the US (Figure 7). In the second half 
of 2011, however, LNG imports fell away rapidly 
as gas was diverted into the Japanese market 
following the shut down of significant nuclear 
electricity generation capacity in the wake of the 
tsunami. Imports of LNG to the UK have remained 
low since 2011, as the strength of Asian demand 
has expanded a long-standing price gap between 
Asian and UK/European markets and continued to 
pull available LNG eastwards.
Extensive investment in LNG import capacity, 
combined with the depth and liquidity of the UK 
gas market, has positioned the UK favourably 
within the evolving global LNG sector. Whether 
this import capacity is utilised, however, depends 
largely on the gap between prices in the UK 
and other markets (principally in Asia, but also 
seasonally in Latin America). Strong price signals 
elsewhere and contract terms that allow diversion 
of cargoes mean that, in a tight market, LNG does 
not flow to the UK. This means that LNG can be 
considered as a source of physical supply for the 
UK and the rest of Europe, but in a ‘tight’ market 
only if prices are sufficiently high to attract it from 
other competing markets. The corollary is that 
in a well (or ‘over’-) supplied LNG market, the UK 
Figure 7. UK LNG Imports, 2005 to 2014
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and the rest of Europe benefit from receiving LNG 
volumes surplus to Asian market requirements 
(with downward pressure on hub prices), as they 
did in 2010 and 2011.
Organisation of UK LNG supply chain
Most research on international gas analyses gas 
trade as a flow between exporting and importing 
states. However, it is firms – and the commercial 
arrangements concluded among them – that 
mobilise gas across national borders. Our analysis 
therefore focussed on the firms and corporate 
networks that organise and comprise the UK’s LNG 
supply chain. A key asset in the supply chain is 
access to import and re-gasification capacity, as 
this provides the physical gateway for LNG to enter 
the UK market. This import capacity exists at the 
three active terminals (Grain, Dragon, South Hook) 
that sit astride physical imports of LNG to the UK. 
There are significant differences among the 
terminals, however, in how import capacity is 
owned and utilised: capacity at Grain is owned 
by National Grid with access sold on commercial 
terms to a range of upstream gas producers and 
utilities; Dragon provides market access for its two 
owners, Petronas and BG; and South Hook provides 
dedicated access to the UK market for LNG from 
the Qatargas II project (a co-venture between Qatar 
Petroleum, ExxonMobil and Total, see Table 3) in 
Qatar’s North Field (Figure 8). 
In practice the UK’s import capacity is embedded 
in international supply chain structures in 
different ways. While geographical variations in 
price between the UK and other markets are the 
primary driver of how much LNG flows to the UK, 
supply chain structures also influence the scale 
and timing of LNG imports. Some import capacity 
in the UK is held by upstream gas producers, such 
as BG, Sonatrach or Qatargas, providing them 
with dedicated access to the UK market. In each 
case, however, the capacity to import into the 
UK is part of a broader portfolio of international 
market access arrangements that allow these 
upstream producers to optimise the placement of 
gas into different markets. For example, although 
South Hook Gas was commissioned as part of an 
integrated supply chain connecting output from 
the Qatargas II mega-train to the UK market, the 
volume of gas placed into the UK via South Hook 
(and Grain) is determined by Qatargas’ global 
marketing strategy and there is no guarantee that 
LNG will be supplied.
Other UK import capacity is held by midstream 
gas players, such as E.ON and Centrica, providing 
supply diversification options for these significant 
actors in the UK gas market. Import capacity 
enables these consumers of gas to conclude 
agreements with LNG producers for delivery into 
the UK. These are essentially options on delivery, 
with pricing terms that reflect conditions under 
which cargoes can be subject to diversion. The 
prevailing price environment in the UK means 
that imports are not generally ‘locked in’ for UK 
delivery. 
Implications
Growth in the availability of LNG initially led to 
predictions of a ‘global gas market’ similar to oil, 
in which an ocean-borne LNG trade connected 
historically separate continental markets, driving 
the convergence of regional gas prices and pricing 
mechanisms. This has proven premature.
As explained earlier, the rapid growth of domestic 
shale gas production initially eroded the US 
as a potentially major market for LNG, only 
Table 3. Co-venturers in the Qatargas II 
Project
The Qatargas II Project consists of 2 LNG ‘mega-
trains,’ each with a capacity of 7.8MMtpy
Train 4 Train 5
Qatar Petroleum 65%
ExxonMobil 30%
Qatar Petroleum 65%
ExxonMobil 18.3%
Total 16.7%
   South Hook Gas
   Centrica, GDF Suez, Sonatrach
   Centrica, E.On, Iberdrola
   BP, Sontrach
   BG Group
   Petronas
   Excelerate
Figure 8. Companies Holding UK Import 
Capacity
South Hook Gas
40%
Centrica, GDF 
Suez, Sonatrach
17%
Centrica,
E.ON,
Iderdrola
13%
BP,
Sonatrach
9%
BG 
Group
7%
Petronas
7%
Excelerate
7%
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to subsequently re-insert it as a potential gas 
exporter. Meanwhile policy decisions in Japan in 
the wake of Fukushima and continuing challenges 
with the nuclear fleet in South Korea have 
reproduced the long-standing primacy of Asian 
demand for LNG.
This combination since 2008, of lower prices 
in North America and rising prices in Asia, has 
enhanced regional price differentials, so that in the 
period 2011-13 they were greater than at any point 
in recent history. Because countries such as Japan 
and Korea currently have no gas supply alternative 
to LNG imports, they have little alternative than 
to pay higher prices than countries such as the 
UK with pipeline gas alternatives. But, as noted 
earlier, Asian buyers are now taking measures to 
drive down the price of LNG, and both Japan and 
South Korea are considering plans to bring Russian 
pipeline gas to their shores. The recent agreement 
between Russia and China to deliver 38 bcm of 
natural gas by pipeline from East Siberia – which 
could soon be increased to 68 bcm in total – will 
also have the impact of dampening LNG demand 
growth in China, as well as setting a new pricing 
benchmark in Northeast Asia.
Clearly, the factors affecting LNG are highly 
dynamic and confound general assertions of a 
‘global’ gas market. It may be that expanding LNG 
is ‘globalising’ gas by increasing the connectivity of 
regional markets, but as it does so it also produces 
new uncertainties and potential vulnerabilities. 
Our research on the UK’s LNG supply chain 
demonstrates how a physical infrastructure for 
LNG supply has been developed in the UK in 
a context of growing import dependency. This 
infrastructure re-positions the UK with respect 
to established international trade in natural gas, 
extending the reach and diversity of UK gas supply 
beyond the North Sea and European continent 
to the Atlantic Basin and Middle East. It further 
shows how this infrastructure is embedded within 
international supply chains in ways that are 
significant for the security of supply. 
4.3 Governance and Control of the European 
Pipeline Network
As demonstrated by recent energy-related 
developments following the Ukraine crisis, the 
policy challenges surrounding the transmission 
of gas across national boundaries are the subject 
of high profile political and media attention. 
This situation can be attributed to the material 
and technical properties of gas: in addition to 
hydrocarbon flows, this resource also ‘transports’ 
relations of political and economic power across 
large geographical spaces. In the European context, 
the importance of gas transit is heightened by 
the European Union’s longstanding efforts to 
implement policies of economic and regulatory 
liberalisation aimed at creating a common gas 
and electricity market. Also of significance in this 
context are the physical character of Europe’s 
energy demand, resource endowment and spatial 
location, which mean that a large volume of the 
continent’s natural gas needs are met via overland 
gas pipelines.
There is evidence to suggest that such processes 
are part of a global reconfiguration of the 
regulatory and corporate structures responsible 
for the production, transmission, distribution and 
consumption of natural gas. As far as Europe and 
the UK are concerned, however, the circulations of 
power and political agency that are associated with 
the emergent geopolitical reality of gas transit are 
poorly understood, especially when placed within 
the context of the wider systemic transformations 
stemming from the movement towards a low-
carbon economy and society (Bouzarovski 2010; 
Bridge et al. 2013; Kama 2014). 
In light of such knowledge gaps, and the policy 
context detailed above, our research has explored 
the different ways in which the transit of natural 
gas across and within national boundaries in the 
European Union allows for the rise of a specific 
regime of institutional and territorial organisation, 
extending beyond the traditional boundaries of 
the nation state. We have been uncovering the 
new political map of Europe constituted by the 
hybrid landscape of state authorities, corporate 
actors and transnational organisations involved in 
governing the material flow of natural gas within 
this geographical realm.
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Drawing upon insights from network governance 
(Bulkeley 2005) and critical geopolitics (Dalby 2010), 
our analyses have explored how legal, policy 
and governmental institutions surrounding the 
transmission of gas reflect the geographical 
structure of the European energy sector. We have 
also sought to highlight the disconnect between 
public concerns over the security of supply, on 
the one hand, and the opportunities for free trade 
created by the emergence of common energy 
markets, on the other. As UKCS production falls, 
the UK is increasingly drawn in to trading in NW 
European markets to attract gas, this means 
that developments in continental Europe are of 
increasing significance to UK gas security.
Our work has been based on semi-structured 
‘expert’ interviews with key informants in the 
European Commission, gas companies and non-
governmental organisations, combined with a 
review of secondary documents. We have also 
undertaken social network analyses of contractual 
links between state and corporate actors in 
the European gas sector, derived from officially 
published reports. Our core analyses, as a whole, 
have been focused on i) the spatial and temporal 
underpinnings of natural gas in Europe, ii) the 
entrance of energy security in the policy agenda, 
iii) the rise of transnational governance networks 
of gas, and iv) the new geo-economic realities 
resulting from recent economic and political 
transformations.
The research has been anchored in current 
academic and policy debates on the notion of 
‘energy governance’. Here, we have emphasised the 
multiple meanings and uses of the ‘governance’ 
concept, which can be used to designate both the 
nature and typology of governing actors, as well as 
the roles and tasks that they undertake (Coutard 
2002). The review has established the growing 
role of transnational bodies in this domain, 
accompanied by processes of neoliberalisation 
(Goldthau and Witte 2009). It has also underlined 
the need for focusing on the complex political 
processes behind energy policy-making, so as to 
move beyond one-dimensional analyses solely 
dedicated to markets or ‘the state’ as relevant 
actors. We have found that the fundamental geo-
economic transformation currently underway in 
the European gas sector necessitates a movement 
away from the traditional emphasis on nation 
states that dominates mainstream understandings 
of the subject.
In exploring the geographical and historical issues 
surrounding the governance of the European 
gas sector, we have uncovered several distinctive 
features in the territorial architecture that 
underpins the socio-technical system for the 
transmission of this resource. Unlike other critical 
infrastructure networks, this system has increased 
incrementally from the bottom up over the last 
150 years, starting from ‘town gas networks’ 
and moving towards a globally oriented regime 
involving a variety of transnational actors.
The resource base of the sector extends well 
into Asia and Africa, thus creating an array 
of economic, political and infrastructural 
interdependencies across a vast set of geographical 
realms. This transnational infrastructure produces 
a ‘hidden integration’ of Europe (Misa and Schot 
2005) that does not easily conform to preconceived 
historical and political cleavages. In addition to 
being spatially diffuse, the physical boundaries 
of this space are highly interconnected with 
neighbouring realms, while being materially 
embedded in wider socio-technical systems for 
the provision of energy. The emergence of highly 
networked spaces (Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the UK) and infrastructural isolates (several 
Eastern European countries, the Baltic States and 
Scandinavia) is not explained by geographical 
factors alone – issues such as economic trust, 
cultural proximity and institutional reforms seem 
to have played a major role.
Our exploration of energy security and 
transnational control of gas transit has found 
that the sector is increasingly run in a manner 
that extends beyond the traditional domains of 
governance, involving organisational actors that 
do not easily lend themselves to conventional 
accountability mechanisms. In particular, the 
EU’s increased involvement and interest in energy 
security issues reflects the broader consolidation of 
gas governance around a distinctive range of policy 
agendas. Possibly the most important of these can 
be found in the domain of gas liberalisation and 
the creation of a common energy market. In an 
effort largely led by the European Commission, a 
series of directives were implemented during the 
1990s and 2000s, allowing for the separation and 
‘ownership unbundling’ of trading, transportation 
and distribution activities, as well as the creation 
of independent regulatory bodies.
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Of special significance here are the provisions of 
the Third Energy Package, involving two directives 
and three regulations for the ‘common internal 
markets’ in electricity and gas adopted in 2009. 
They have helped put in place a regime in which 
transmission network businesses have become 
regulated monopolies that are not always owned 
by the state (Stern 2013). 
There is evidence that such developments 
have been decreasing the relevance of political 
tensions at the EU-Russia energy interface, by 
facilitating intra-regional co-operation among 
EU member states, and leading to further market 
opening and grid interconnectivity. The EU has 
been supporting them via the development of an 
institutional framework for co-operation with the 
wider European neighbourhood, exporting the 
market acquis to accession states via the Energy 
Community Treaty, and promoting efforts to secure 
gas from regions such as the Caspian and North 
Africa.
Academic research on the issue has emphasized 
that the EU is pursuing its aims through 
three models of energy co-operation: the 
community model (compliance and rule-
based multilateralism), the partnership model 
(intergovernmentalism) and bilateral diplomacy 
(Padgett 2011). The fact that a wide range of 
geographic interests, energy priorities, and 
governance institutions has been employed to 
maintain such dynamics was also confirmed 
by two of our interviewees in the European 
Commission. The EU’s efforts in establishing the 
single gas market have been accompanied by the 
decline of oil-indexed long-term contracts (LTCs) – 
traditionally the main method of supplying gas to 
European markets.
The decline of oil-indexation and LTC’s is not only 
the result of the liberalisation and integration 
of the gas sector; the ‘virtual elimination of oil 
products from many stationary energy sectors in 
these markets’ (Stern and Rogers 2011) has also 
played a key role, in addition to the changing risk 
ownership structure in the gas value chain, in 
‘which back-to-back selling at oil-linked prices 
is difficult’ (DNV KEMA Energy & Sustainability 
2013). Such processes have precipitated the rise of 
wholesale gas spot and forward markets, creating 
a situation whereby midstream importing and 
wholesale companies have been ‘squeezed between 
gas bought upstream at oil-linked prices and gas 
sold downstream based on wholesale market 
prices’ (ibid).
Overall, the restructuring of the European gas 
markets has added a new layer or complexity 
and diversity to an already multi-faceted 
governance landscape. According to Stern (2013), 
this institutional tapestry involves a combination 
of upstream actors (national and international 
gas companies), network bodies (transmission 
and distribution owners and operators which 
are becoming legally ‘unbundled’ from other 
entities), downstream actors (shippers, retailers 
and marketers, subject to an additional layer 
of regulation) and ‘financial players’, where the 
regulation is of a financial nature.
The organisational richness of the European 
natural gas architecture becomes even more 
evident when contractual relationships among 
transmission sector operators at cross-border 
trading points are analysed using network 
mapping techniques (Figure 9). In addition to 
the dense institutional linkages surrounding 
the two major exporters to Europe (the Russian 
Gazprom and Norwegian Gassco), the work that 
we undertook in this part of the study revealed 
the existence of a weaker set of relations in the 
Mediterranean, focused on the imports of Algerian 
gas. Also evident was the crucial role of the Nord 
Stream pipeline in helping bridge the transmission 
gap between the Gazprom and Gassco systems. 
Arguably, this link plays one of the most important 
roles towards the creation of a unified European 
network. 
Source: Nord Stream AG
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The network analyses also highlighted the 
key role that a limited set of companies – GDF 
Suez, Gasunie, E.ON, Wintershall, Fluxys and 
OpenGridEurope – play in facilitating transmission 
connections across the continent. This reflects 
findings by Stern (2013), who identifies these 
stakeholders, in addition to RWE, Enel, Endesa, 
Iberdrola and Vattenfall as being the main 
owners of a variety of gas assets across a number 
of European countries, thanks to a number of 
relatively recent mergers and acquisitions.
It is worth noting that the main basis of many such 
companies is in the electricity sector, which allows 
them to dominate the utility landscape as a whole. 
This has transpired despite the recent withdrawal 
of traditional utility companies from the gas 
sector in Eastern Europe, and their increasing 
replacement with financial investors (reflecting a 
broader trend across the continent, see Daborowski 
2013).
In its entirety, our work has highlighted the 
increasingly influential background role of the 
EU, in addition to the new layering of institutional 
actors as a result of expanding state regulation 
throughout the supply chain and the increasing 
concentration of power within a limited set 
of corporate bodies. Consequently, as the UK’s 
domestic gas production continues to decline, it 
will be critical that we assess the implications of 
the evolution of a single European gas market for 
UK gas security. 
 Figure 9. A Network Map of Capacities 
and Connections at Cross-Border Gas 
Transmission Points in the EU and 
Associated Countries
Note: Cross-border points within the EU are 
marked by white circles. Dark red circles represent 
non-EU import border points, and red circles 
indicate LNG terminals. Darker lines indicate 
connections between EU countries and non-EU gas 
transmission border points or LNG terminals. 
Source: ENTSOG
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Writing a decade ago, just as the UK became a net 
importer, Stern (2004) warned that it was time to 
get serious about UK gas security. At the time he 
identified four gas security issues:
• “Running out of gas” i.e. exhaustion of 
resources, from both a UK national and an 
indigenous European perspective.
• Increasing dependence on imports, particularly 
from distant, “non-European” sources.
• Whether liberalisation of gas markets adds to 
the risk of major investments and therefore the 
danger of failing to attract long-term supplies, 
and increases in price volatility.
• Contingency planning for events of low 
probability – e.g. severe weather, technical 
breakdown, terrorism – but potential market 
impact.
Over the last decade all of these issues have tested 
the UK’s gas security, domestic and European 
production continue to decline and imports now 
represent 70 per cent of the gas consumed in the 
European Union (European Commission 2014). In 
the case of the UK, new sources of supply have 
emerged in the form of LNG, predominantly from 
Qatar. When the UK was a net exporter of natural 
gas it was less exposed to physical security of 
supply concerns, but the open nature of the gas 
market meant that it was still exposed to price 
insecurity. However, the rise in import dependence 
has coincided with a period of uncertainty and 
volatility.
The resilience of the system has been tested in 
a number of occasions, mostly due to technical 
failings (Skea et al. 2012), but also the Russia-
Ukraine gas disputes in 2006 and 2009, and also 
extreme weather events such as the long and cold 
winter of 2013.
In March 2013 a combination of events both 
climatic and technical prompted a gas emergency 
in the UK, but the resulting prices signals meant 
that additional gas was soon supplied to the 
UK market, largely from NW Europe via the 
interconnectors, but also in the form of LNG. 
However, as UK import dependency seems likely to 
increase in the coming years; DECC’s (2014a) latest 
gas production projections suggest 57 per cent 
import dependency in 2020, are there additional 
measures that need to be taken to improve UK gas 
security? 
This final substantive section deploys the supply 
chain approach presented in section 3 to analyse 
the dimensions and issues that shape the UK’s gas 
security. The discussion is organised around the 
three stages in the gas supply chain – upstream, 
midstream and downstream – and identifies the 
key energy security issues and the measures that 
can be taken to increase resilience and mitigate 
risk (see Table 4).
Table 4. A Supply Chain Approach to Gas Security
Geopolitics Dimensions Issues
U
p
st
re
am Security
of
Supply
• Resource Base
• Technology
• Investment
• UKCS
• NCS
• Europe - Russia/North Africa
• LNG Supply
• Unconventional Gas
M
id
st
re
am Security
of
Transport
(Transit)
• Processing
• Transportation
• Storage
• LNG Terminals
• Interconnectors and Third Package
• National Transmission System
• Storage
• National Balancing Point/Hubs
D
ow
n
st
re
am
Security
of
Demand
• Power Generation
• Industrial Use
• Domestic Use
• Role of Gas in UK energy strategy
• Intermittency and Capacity Markets
• Future Gas Demand
• Carbon Floor Price & ETS
• Carbon Capture & Storage
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Upstream Security Issues
One of our concerns about the energy security 
literature is that it tends to focus too much on 
upstream physical security of supply issues. The 
IEA’s (2014) latest report on the Energy Supply 
Security of member states says the following about 
the UK:
“ UK natural gas imports amounted to 37 bcm in 2012 – around 47 per cent of its requirements. The Country’s imports are relatively diversified, with significant imports 
from Norway (54 per cent of total imports), Qatar 
(26 per cent) and the Netherlands (15 per cent). It 
has also expanded and diversified its gas import 
infrastructure to compensate for the ongoing 
decline in domestic production.”
This is an accurate description of the current 
situation, but our analysis suggests that the 
figures belie a much more complex situation that 
stems from the fact that whether or not sufficient 
gas flows into the UK is determined by market 
actors and market conditions that are beyond 
the influence of the state. At any given time, a 
shortfall in the UK should be reflected in a higher 
NBP price that will attract imports, either by 
pipeline or LNG. As domestic production continues 
to fall, even more of the UK’s demand is subject 
to those wider market conditions. Through the 
interconnectors, the NBP is already integrated into 
a wider European market as it increasingly draws 
on the same sources of gas to satisfy UK demand 
as continental traders. As noted earlier, any change 
in Norway’s ability to supply European demand 
would have to be met by increased supplies from 
elsewhere, most likely Russia (see Dickel et al., 
(2014) for an assessment of none Russia source 
of future gas supply). At the same time, as the 
global gas market becomes more connected, events 
as far away as Japan have an impact on market 
conditions in Europe and the UK in relation to the 
supply of LNG.
These observations sit well with National Grid’s 
(2013a) notion of the ‘Global Gas Markets’ axiom 
whereby they identify a number of sources of 
uncertainty in relation for future UK gas supply:
• Development of new fields in the UKCS and 
Norway
• The development of UK shale gas reserves
• Further liberalisation of the European gas 
market and access to transmission and storage
• LNG market developments especially the 
extent and impact of Chinese demand.
The Development of UK Shale Gas Potential
Obviously, any future developments in the UKCS 
are significant in that they help to slow the decline 
in domestic production, but the projections 
suggests a continuing decline rate of 5 per cent 
a year. In that context, the UK Government has 
accepted the recommendations of the recent 
Wood Review: UKCS Maximising Recovery Review 
(Wood 2014).  However, UK politicians are also 
placing great hopes on the development of onshore 
unconventional oil and gas to provide new sources 
of domestic supply. This project has not been about 
shale gas in the UK; however, we have paid close 
attention to the debate as it has raised concerns 
about UK gas security more generally. A proper 
assessment of UK shale gas production potential 
requires further research, but at present we would 
caution against assuming that domestic shale gas 
can make a contribution to UK gas security until 
well into the 2020s. The bottom line is that the 
industry in the UK is still in its infancy and a 2-3 
year exploration programme is required before we 
can even begin to answer key questions about flow 
rates and prospects for commercial development 
at scale. 
Commercial development will require a substantial 
supply chain that is not currently in place, and a 
so-called ‘Social Licence to Operate.’ At present, 
there is considerable public suspicion in relation 
to shale gas and the current 14th Licencing 
Round will serve as a litmus test of both investor 
interest in UK shale and public opinion about its 
development. There are various projections out 
there about how much gas might be produced from 
UK shale deposits, all of which should be treated 
with a high degree of caution.
The much-quoted Institute of Directors report 
(2013) suggests that: “A multi-year development 
of 100 shale gas padsof 40 laterals each could 
see peak production of 853 bcf (24.2 bcm) a year 
in the low scenario, 1,121 bcf (31.7 bcm) in the 
central scenario and 1,389 bcf (39.3 bcm) in the 
high scenario.” Furthermore they estimate that: 
“Development of 100 10-well pads of 40 laterals 
could lower the import bill to £9.5 billion in 2030 in 
the low scenario, £7.5 billion in the central scenario 
and £5.6 billion in the high scenario. In 2030, in the 
low scenario, gas import dependency could be 46 
per cent; in the central scenario, 37 per cent; and 
in the high scenario, gas import dependency could 
fall to 27 per cent.” 
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An alternative analysis by Rogers (2013) suggests 
that: “after 10 years a production level of 8 bcma is 
achieved by drilling 300 new wells each year (from 
25 new pads per year, each with its own drilling 
rig).” As noted earlier, National Grid (2014a) has 
highlighted the high degree of uncertainty over 
the future contribution from shale gas in the UK. 
Amidst this uncertainty, three things are clear: 
first, that we simply do not know what future 
levels of shale gas production are likely to be; 
second, that significant levels of production are 
unlikely until the 2020s at the earliest; and third, 
that there is a high probability that the UK will 
continue to meet the majority of its gas demand 
through imports. Any talk of shale gas making 
the UK self-sufficient again, let alone allowing 
significant exports, is far fetched.  Equally, in a 
wider European context progress in developing 
shale gas will be slow and both the IEA (2013) and 
BP (2014) see Europe producing less than 30 bcm 
from shale gas in the early 2030s. This means that 
during the second-half of this decade both UK and 
European gas import dependence will inevitably 
rise, unless demand is significantly constrained.
Midstream Security Issues
Table 4 identifies a number of issues in the 
midstream. The UK does not presently face any 
direct geopolitical transit security concerns. 
However, the two interconnectors and the various 
pipelines from the North Sea are subject to 
technical risks that often result in short-term 
price spikes on the NBP. The UK also benefits from 
having three operational LNG terminals, whose 
activities are closely monitored by gas traders. 
However, there are two sources of indirect transit 
security threat.
First, the interconnectors source gas from the 
continental European market and although these 
are recorded as coming from the Netherlands and 
Belgium these supplies are back-filled by supplies 
upstream. Thus, transit disruptions further 
upstream – be it problems between Russia and 
Ukraine or civil unrest in Libya – have implications 
for UK gas security. This tends to be reflected 
through price volatility. In fact, in the past when 
these interruptions have resulted in higher prices 
on continental markets, gas has flowed from the 
UK to Europe.
Figure 10. The Changing Geography of UK Gas Supply and Distribution
Source: National Grid 2012
 Gas Transmission System
2000 2012
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Second, the UK’s dependence on Qatar for the 
vast majority of its LNG imports means that 
it is exposed to possible transit interruptions 
through the Straits of Hormuz and the Suez Canal 
(Emmerson and Stevens 2012). However, should 
there be such a disruption the UK is very much 
better placed to use alternative sources of supply 
than major LNG importers, such as Japan and 
South Korea. In any case given the importance of 
the Straits of Hormuz to global oil trade flows there 
would be many more powerful interests than the 
UK incentivised to rapidly resolve the situation.
The National Transmission System
The changing geography of gas supply into the 
UK has required to National Grid, as the owner 
and operator of the National Transmission 
System (NTS), to make significant investments 
in the pipeline system. Figure 10, which is based 
on the National Grid’s 2012 Ten Year Statement, 
illustrates the scale and direction of the changes. 
The initial system was based on the requirement 
to bring significant amount of gas onshore from 
both the UKCS and the NCS and move it to 
major consuming centres in the south. However, 
things have changed significantly since 2000 
and there are more entry points into the system, 
including new pipelines from the North Sea, 
such as Langeled operated by Norway’s Gassco, a 
second interconnector the BBL connecting to the 
Netherlands, and an additional interconnector to 
Ireland. Just as significantly, the commissioning 
of the three LNG terminals has also impacted 
on domestic gas flows. The construction of two 
terminals at Milford Haven required substantial 
investment (£700 million) in the so-called ‘South 
Wales Gas Pipeline’ to move gas from the Dragon 
and South Hook LNG terminals to the Midlands. 
The pipeline was controversial and any attempt 
to expand LNG import capacity at Milford Haven 
would probably again face strong resistance 
if it required additional pipeline construction 
(for an analysis of public acceptance of natural 
gas infrastructure in the UK see Marsden and 
Markusson 2011). At present, however, gas flows 
from the LNG terminal are modest. Falling 
production in the UKCS has also resulted in more 
gas having to flow north, requiring investment 
in reverse flow capacity. There are a number of 
future developments that will require additional 
investment in the NTS and DECC (2014b) reports 
that: “The total expenditure for gas transmission 
networks across GB between 2013 and 2021 is £5.5 
billion.” 
As the role of gas changes from base load power 
generation to back up for intermittent renewables, 
so the scale and direction of flows in the NTS 
will change. On the supply side there are still a 
relatively small number of entry points into the 
NTS (9 terminals at present), however, should 
there be significant shale gas development in 
the UK this will change the geography of supply. 
Given the nature of shale gas production it will 
require producers to process their production and 
build pipeline connections to the NTS. The net 
result may be numerous smaller points of entry 
into the NTS, much like the impact of wind farms 
on the electricity grid. The UK shale gas industry 
considers the NTS a major advantage, but the 
costs and impacts of connection will need to be 
considered when assessing the prospects for shale 
gas in the UK.
Gas Storage
The UK has not invested a lot in building gas 
storage capacity; rather it has relied on: a) early 
discovered fields (pre-liberalisation) under long 
term contracts with high seasonal flexibility, 
however as these fields have declined this option 
has dwindled, b) from the mid 2000s pipeline 
imports from Norway and the Netherlands 
adopting a seasonal profile, mainly driven by the 
upstream suppliers to take advantage of higher 
winter NBP prices, and c) use of storage facilities 
at ‘arms length’ in France and Germany with 
seasonal flows via the interconnector and the 
continental grid. Now the UK finds itself with only 
4.6 bcm of gas storage with total demand in 2013 
at 78 bcm (DECC 2014). According to the recent 
IEA study (2014a), the UK has three types of gas 
storage: long-range storage at Rough that is a 
depleted offshore gasfield and accounts for three-
quarters of total UK storage capacity, medium-
term storage (in salt caverns such as Aldbrough 
in East Yorkshire that was opened in 2011 and 
depleted gas fields such as Hatfield Moor in South 
Yorkshire) and short-range storage (peak shaving 
LNG plants).
The economics of storage lies in the ability to 
purchase and store gas in the summer months 
and sell it when prices are higher in the winter. 
The industry in the UK maintains that the 
commercial case for gas storage is no longer 
convincing because the prices difference between 
summer and winter are not sufficient to make 
new storage profitable. Bros (2012) maintains that 
companies found it more attractive to invest in 
LNG terminals than storage facilities, with the 
aim of benefitting from arbitrage opportunities 
(buying cheaper LNG and selling it onto the UK 
market for a higher price). This, together with the 
interconnectors, means that there are alternatives 
to traditional storage and explains why there are 
a lot of potential storage facilities with planning 
permission, but very little new capacity is actually 
under construction.
The key issue is; if it is needed, who should pay for 
increasing storage capacity? The answer probably 
lies in the fact that different types of storage 
address different problems. A key consideration 
being the speed with which they can fill and the 
rate at which gas can be withdrawn. They all need 
to retain a certain amount of ‘cushion gas’ to 
maintain the integrity of the facility (the same is 
true of LNG storage tanks) and provide a minimum 
operating pressure. As a result of an exhaustive 
analysis of all the issues, Le Fevre (2013) concludes 
that the need for storage in the UK is driven by two 
requirements:
• “The need for growing flexibility as a result of 
increased variability of demand for gas-fired 
power generation caused by the intermittency 
of wind-powered renewable energy;
• To underpin supply security in the event of an 
outage in a major supply source.”
At present, existing storage, gas at LNG terminals 
and the interconnection accessing ‘arms length’ 
storage have provided sufficient resilience in the 
face of short-term technical disruptions; but 
large-scale geopolitical disruptions – in the distant 
upstream and transit choke points – present 
different challenges. Because the UK largely relies 
on short-term market access, rather than long-
term contracts (particularly for LNG), the lack of 
storage will be reflected in vulnerability to price 
volatility as domestic shortages are manifested in a 
higher NBP price to attract gas to the UK.
However, new LNG cargoes can take a matter of 
weeks to arrive – the journey from Ras Laffan in 
Qatar to South Hook in Wales can take 18 days. 
Thus, to balance the market, storage is needed 
to provide a short-term cushion. A further 
consideration is that 75 per cent of the UK’s storage 
is in a single facility at Rough, which experienced 
a fire in 2006. As the March 2013 episode suggests, 
technical failures can happen in parallel, when 
storage and LNG terminal inventories are low (and 
even then not all of the LNG terminals supplied 
gas at the time even though the NPB spiked). 
Equally, NW Europe often has a weather pattern 
in late winter that results in low temperatures 
and little or no wind, which means that wind 
power generation is negligible and gas demand 
for power generation high. At such a time, any 
technical failure in the UK gas supply system 
places significant demand on storage. The later in 
the winter season, the greater the likelihood that 
storage inventory will be low, as in March 2013.
Ofgem’s Project Discovery (2010) raised concerns 
about UK gas security and Ofgem followed this up 
with a gas security of supply report (Ofgem,2012) 
that concluded the UK system was sufficiently 
resilient and that only extreme circumstances 
would result in physical disruptions to supply. 
The UK Government subsequently commissioned 
another study, this time by Redpoint (2013) that 
examined the impact of gas market interventions 
on energy security. This complex report enabled 
the government, by selecting certain cases/
scenarios, to conclude that there was no case 
for further intervention in the market; rather 
they would continue to rely on market signals to 
encourage private sector investment in additional 
storage – even though little has been forthcoming. 
However, Stern (2011) maintains that the market 
alone will not deliver the necessary level of storage 
– which he estimates is in the range of 12-14 bcm 
or three times current levels – instead: “rationing 
by price during periods of shortage will be the only 
available solution to gas security problems in the 
future, as it has been in the past.” 
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It is not unreasonable to expect industry to invest 
in the storage capacity needed to ensure the 
effective operation of the market – including any 
obligations placed on them by the regulator to 
provide security of supply. However, given current 
concerns about Russian gas supplies to Europe 
and the UK’s increasing reliance on long-distance 
supply of LNG, there may be a case for what Stern 
(2011) calls ‘strategic storage’ that by definition 
would be held in reserve to deal with longer-term 
disruptions lasting weeks or even months.
It is noteworthy that six OECD countries – all in 
Europe – place gas stock obligations on domestic 
companies (IEA 2014a). Interruptible contracts and 
alternative fuel obligations to reduce demand are 
already part of the gas emergency response system 
in the UK, but they are insufficient to deal with 
such a longer-disruption of physical supply. LeFevre 
(2013) suggests that the Government and Ofgem 
need to monitor developments that might merit a 
re-appraisal of the case for intervention, these are:
• A major increase in forecast gas demand
• A material change in the geopolitics of LNG 
supply
• A reduction in the pace of liberalisation of the 
NW European gas market
• An appreciable widening of price spreads that 
did not stimulate new storage investments
We now seem stuck in a situation where the 
industry will not invest in additional capacity 
without government subsidy and the current 
government has set its face against providing 
such a subsidy. We would agree with LeFevre that, 
as a minimum, the issue needs to be monitored 
in the wider context of other challenges to UK 
gas security, in particular the ability of the UK to 
attract sufficient LNG when needed at prices that 
are affordable.
The National Balancing Point
The final element of the midstream that is usually 
overlooked in discussions of UK gas security is 
the NBP, the virtual market based on the physical 
infrastructure of the NTS that links suppliers with 
buyers, often through financial intermediaries. 
The NBP was not the focus of our research and we 
have found it difficult to fathom; but we accept 
the fact that the UK currently has a deep and 
liquid market based on gas-to-gas competition 
and the rules of supply and demand and that this 
is undoubtedly a source of security. However, for 
good or bad, it does significantly reduce the scope 
for government intervention and mean that the 
UK must reply on price signals to attract gas to 
the UK market, just like any other commodity. It is 
therefore important to monitor the health of the 
market in terms of the number of players and the 
levels of trading activity (as well as it compliance 
with financial regulations). Equally, the emergence 
of strong gas trading hubs in continental Europe, 
such as the Netherland’s TTF, has important 
implications for the future of NBP. In an integrating 
European gas market where hub-based trading 
is gaining prominence (it accounted for 50 per 
cent of gas sales in 2013), the NBP increasingly 
reflects wider European market conditions (witness 
the convergence between hub prices identified 
by Petrovich 2013). This is not necessarily a 
problem, rather it is the logical outcome of market 
integration; but it is important to monitor the 
development of hub-based trading in continental 
Europe and its impact on the functioning and 
status of the NBP.
Overall, we would argue that the status of the UK’s 
midstream is essential to maintaining gas security 
of supply and its status requires careful monitoring 
to ensure that there is sufficient capacity and 
flexibility to maintain a deep and liquid market.  
Storage remains a controversial issue, but this 
must be assessed against developments in a wider 
European and global context. There is no room for 
complacency given the increasing complexity of 
global gas geopolitics. One final observation is that 
we have used the term UK, but the status of the 
midstream has important implications for Ireland, 
which is dependent on the UK for its gas and for 
NW Europe as the UK still exports gas. 
Upstream Security Concerns
For investors to continue to invest in upstream 
production and midstream capacity they must feel 
confident that there will be sufficient gas demand 
in Europe in the future to provide a return on their 
capital investment. In the UK, as in the rest of 
Europe, there is currently considerable uncertainty 
about the future role of gas in the energy mix and 
thus the level of future gas demand. The trajectory 
of the low-carbon transition will inevitably result 
in a significant fall in the demand for natural gas; 
however, the key issue at present is not ‘gas or no 
gas’, but ‘how much gas for how long?’ This is a 
whole systems question in that the role of gas and 
the scale of gas demand are dependent on the pace 
of decarbonisation of the whole system and on 
measures to reduce energy demand and increase 
energy efficiency (see also Bassi et al. 2013).
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At present gas demand is split equally between 
three sectors – gas-power generation, industry 
and households. The UK’s energy and climate 
strategy is based on the decarbonisation of power 
generation through a new generation of nuclear 
power stations and expansion of renewable energy 
(principally wind) and the electrification of the 
economy. In terms of gas demand, as noted earlier, 
this means that the role of gas in the power sector 
is changing from contributing to base load to 
backing-up renewable intermittency.
In households gas, which is currently to dominant 
fuel for space heating, will be replaced by 
electricity and other low carbon technologies. This 
is the theory and it is on this basis that official 
projections of future gas demand are based, as 
reflected in National Grid’s ‘Gone Green’ scenario.  
It is only projections such as the National Grid’s 
(2013) ‘Slow Progression’ that give us a sense of 
the possible alternative scenarios that result from 
policy failure manifested in a slowdown in the rate 
of decarbonisation. The latter may be caused by 
delays in implementing key infrastructures – such 
as a new fleet of nuclear power stations – or by a 
change in policy direction (such as revisions to the 
4th Carbon Budget) or firm limits placed on total 
government financial support for renewables and 
capacity payments, Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) etc.
In short, uncertainty about the pace of progress 
with the UK’s decarbonisation strategy is 
translating directly into uncertainty about 
the future of UK gas demand and this is 
already impacting on investment in upstream 
infrastructure, specifically new gas power 
generation (CCGT). The current Government’s 
solution to the security of demand dilemma is the 
Gas Generation Strategy (DECC 2012b), which is 
part of the wider Electricity Market Reform. The 
aim of the strategy is to reduce the uncertainty 
around gas generation for investors. The specific 
challenge is to encourage new investment in CCGT 
power generating capacity when the load on that 
capacity will be lower than has traditionally been 
the case due to the increase in low carbon and 
renewable power generation. 
There is already considerable volatility on the grid 
and DECC’s (2012b) own numbers show average 
CCGT load factors falling from 71 per cent in 1996 
to 48 per cent in 2011. This situation has been 
made worse by the return of cheap coal and some 
CCGT capacity in the UK is currently mothballed. 
In 2013 the share of coal in electricity supply fell 
from to 35 percent, down from 38 per cent the 
previous year. However, the role of gas also fell by 1 
per cent as renewables grew in significance (DECC 
2014c). But, as coal capacity closes, and there is the 
likelihood of delays in new nuclear, the amount 
of gas power generation needed to meet capacity 
margins will increase. DECC (2012b) concludes: “Up 
to 2030, we will need significant new investment 
in CCGT’s as existing capacity reaches the end 
of its life, potentially up to 26 GW including 
capacity that has recently been commissioned or is 
expected to be commission shortly.”
The creation of a Capacity Market is the policy 
mechanism to ensure that this capacity is built. 
Under this scheme providers will be paid for 
providing reliable capacity, compensating for the 
fact that the load on that capacity will be lower 
than that traditionally required to make a business 
case for investment. According to the central 
scenario in the Gas Generation Strategy (DECC 
2012b), “in 2020, CCGT’s are estimated to have 
an average load factor of 25 per cent, rising to 38 
per cent by 2025.” In the late 2020s new nuclear 
generation and the availability of Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) will impact on CCGT load factors 
and thus: “In 2030 it is projected that CCGT’s will 
supply 88 TWh of electricity, representing 22 per 
cent of electricity generated that year the share is 
about 40 per cent at present. This is translated into 
an average load factor of 27 per cent for the CCGT 
fleet.”
In simple terms, the strategy will pay industry 
to build more CCGT’s and then compensate 
them to use them less, the net result being lower 
levels of gas demand, but with greater variability 
and uncertainty about that demand (which has 
implications for the NTS and storage). At present, 
there is no business case to support building new 
CCGT capacity – particularly with existing capacity 
mothballed or running at low load factors.  The 
first Capacity Auction is scheduled for later this 
year, so we must wait and see.  
Earlier in this report we cautioned against placing 
too much emphasis on the power generation sector 
as the sole arbiter of future gas demand. There is 
clearly a need to understand the nature of future 
gas demand in industry and in the household 
sector. Equally, there are possible new areas of 
gas demand, such as gas in transportation and 
LNG in marine bunkering. In short, it is important 
to understand the prospects for future UK gas 
demand beyond the power sector.
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In the household sector the emphasis is on 
improving the energy efficiency of buildings and 
the developing alternatives to gas; but there is 
also a need to understand what this means for 
gas demand and its associated infrastructure (for 
an example of recent UKERC work in this area 
see Eyre and Pranab 2014). A significant reduction 
in household gas demand would have a major 
impact not just in terms of the volume of gas, but 
also the seasonality of demand. In other words, 
there is a need to work backwards from the future 
energy demand scenarios to understand what 
the low carbon transition means for gas demand 
outside of the power sector. Again, it is not just 
the consequences of policy implementation that 
matter, policy failures are equally important. For 
example, if households prove resistant to removing 
their old gas boilers and want to stick with their 
gas cookers, this has significant implications for 
future gas demand. From our perspective as social 
scientists working on energy security, industrial gas 
demand remains a black box and it is important 
to understand what gas is used for and how that 
demand is likely to change in the future.
In sum, the gas security literature has a strong 
security of supply bias, but the scale of future 
gas demand has a critical bearing on both the 
resilience of the system to supply side shocks and 
the adequacy of the midstream infrastructure (and 
the business models that support it), hence the 
need for a supply chain approach. In the UK energy 
research community there is an understandable 
focus on building the new low carbon system 
and promoting energy efficiency and demand 
reduction; but we also need to pay much greater 
attention to the consequences of fossil fuel 
demand destruction, particularly in relation to gas 
security. We need a much better understanding 
of the implications of the low carbon energy 
transition for gas demand.
Put another way, how much gas can we burn in the 
UK in the future (with or without CCS) and remain 
within our carbon budgets? At the same time, we 
also need to recognise that natural gas represents 
the fall back position for policy failure or slippage 
whereby a finite constraint is placed on financial 
support for decarbonisation. The net result may 
very well be that we will end up needing a lot more 
gas for longer – with or without CCS – and that will 
have significant implications for both our climate 
change strategy and energy security (understood as 
both physical security of supply and price security 
of supply). 
6
Conclusions and Policy 
Implications
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This project has sought to examine the 
implications of global gas security and governance 
for UK energy security. This final section considers 
these two issues and then turns to the specific 
policy implications of our research findings. The 
latter is organised around the supply structure that 
has shaped our analysis.
Global Gas Security
The starting proposition of our project is that UK 
has effectively been globalising its gas security 
as increasing import dependence has exposed 
consumers to global developments in gas markets.  
In this respect, our research suggests that there 
are three interrelated areas of concern for the UK 
that are a consequence of increased exposure to 
European gas market integration, on the one hand, 
and developments in the global LNG market, on 
the other hand.
• The first relates to the status of the NBP. As 
European gas market integration deepens 
and continental gas trading hubs continue 
to develop, the NBP may lose its pre-eminent 
status.  But, provided that sufficient midstream 
infrastructure is in place to keep the NBP 
physically connected with continental hubs, 
this should be viewed as a positive and 
inevitable result of market integration.
• The second follows the first and relates to the 
Europe’s current and continued reliance on 
Russian gas imports. Hub prices in Northwest 
Europe (including NBP by the action of 
arbitrage) are still strongly influenced both 
by the scale of Russian gas flows and their 
continued reliance on oil indexed pricing, and 
it will be some time before this influence is 
significantly reduced. This means that, as our 
import dependency increases, the UK needs 
to pay greater attention to developments in 
Russia-EU gas relations than it has in the past.
• The third relates to the reliance on LNG as part 
of the supply mix in the UK.  In a ‘tight’ global 
market, such as at present, LNG exerts limited 
influence over UK gas prices. But in a well 
or oversupplied LNG market (when the NBP 
price is able to attract LNG cargoes) it can be 
beneficial for consumers in the UK and Europe 
as it constrains Russia’s price ambitions.
Gas Governance
At the onset of this project, we criticised the 
existing literature for assuming that oil and gas 
were the same when it came to issues of energy 
security, for being too state-centric in its analysis 
of trade and for playing insufficient attention to 
the role of companies and other non-state actors. 
Our research has shown how the gas supply chain 
is subject to complex multi-scalar governance that 
involves transnational and national state actors 
– the EU and UK governments in our case – and 
a variety of companies with different ownership 
structures operating at national, international 
and global scales. At the same time, the material 
specificities of natural gas and its dependence on 
fixed infrastructures mean that ownership is often 
unbundled and markets regulated. In the UK, the 
National Grid plays a crucial role as the owner and 
operator of the NTS, Ofgem is the regulator and 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change is 
responsible for energy policy. As our case study 
of the European pipeline network reveals, the 
constellation of state authorities, regulators and 
companies varies greatly across Europe and adds 
considerable complexity to the challenge of market 
integration. Equally, our case study of the UK LNG 
supply chain demonstrates how in the upstream 
our dominant source of LNG supply is orchestrated 
as part of the global marketing strategy of Qatar 
Petroleum. 
When it comes to downstream, the fate of future 
UK gas demand will be determined in large part 
by the investment strategies of companies in the 
power sector and by industrial consumers, as 
well as the preferences of individual households. 
Increasingly, the UK Government is intervening in 
the ‘market’ to drive forward its decarbonisation 
strategy and, as our discussion of security of 
demand illustrates, it is important to understand 
the implications of this strategy for the multitude 
of actors involved in the UK gas supply chain. 
Increasingly it seems that natural gas (methane) 
is treated more as part of the problem; rather 
than an essential part of the solution, especially 
when other things go wrong. The net result is 
that investors are uncertain about the future of 
gas demand and thus hesitant to invest in new 
infrastructure and generating capacity, which 
creates even greater uncertainty about the future 
role of gas.
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Policy Implications
This final section considers the policy implications 
of the findings of our research by identifying issues 
for policy action and issues of policy significance 
that require monitoring or new research. 
Upstream Implications
Our research has identified five critical issues to 
the future of UK gas security of supply:
• There is a need to monitor the status of 
the UKCS and the effectiveness of policy 
interventions (following the Wood Review) to 
support renewed investment to slow the rate 
of decline. This is because the rate of decline of 
indigenous offshore gas production is currently 
the most critical factor driving increased 
import dependency;
• There is a need to assess the prospects for the 
development of unconventional (shale) gas in 
the UK and in Europe more generally;
• There is a need to monitor the status of 
Norwegian gas production and its continued 
role in supplying a substantial portion of UK 
and NW European requirements;
• There is a need to monitor developments in the 
supply of Russian gas to European markets;
• There is a need to monitor developments in the 
global LNG market – particularly in relation to 
Asian demand growth and expansion of LNG 
export capacity – and assess their implications 
for future UK LNG supplies. 
Midstream Implications
Here we identify three issues, but would also 
observe that it is technical failures in the 
midstream that are most often the source of short-
term supply disruptions and these may become 
more frequent as the existing infrastructure ages. 
• There is a need to ensure that the NTS has 
sufficient capacity and flexibility to respond 
to changing patterns of supply and demand 
related to supply diversification (including 
future shale gas production) and increased 
intermittency due to growing renewable power 
generation;
• There is a need to monitor the case for 
additional gas storage, both by the industry to 
ensure the functioning of the market in light 
of increasing intermittency and by the state 
in support of ‘strategic storage’ to mitigate 
against major infrastructure failures or supply 
disruptions in the distant upstream that might 
result in longer-term supply problems.
• There is a need to monitor the liquidity and 
status of the NBP and to ensure its continued 
linkage to European hubs and the reliability of 
linking pipeline infrastructure.
Downstream Implications
We consider this to be an overlooked element of 
the assessment UK gas security and it is an area 
where it is necessary to integrate research focused 
on the gas sector with research on the system 
wide consequences of decarbonisation (UKERC’s 
whole systems approach).  We have identified five 
elements of the downstream gas demand dilemma 
that require further consideration.
• There is a need to monitor the consequences of 
the current ‘return of coal’ and the impact of 
the LCPD and Industrial Emissions Directive on 
the timing of coal-fired plant closures in the UK 
and their implications for gas demand.
• There is a need to monitor the impact of the 
failure of the EU’s Emission Trading System 
and any attempts to reform it on EU and UK 
gas demand, alongside the impact of the UK’s 
minimum carbon floor price.
• There is a need to monitor and understand the 
response of the power generation sector to the 
UK Government’s Gas Generation Strategy and 
the implementation of the first auction under 
the Capacity Mechanism planned for later this 
year, as this will have a significant bearing on 
future gas demand.
• There is a need to consider the implications 
of the rate of progress on CCS for future gas 
demand in the UK. This is subject of research 
in UKERC, but the Government’s assumptions 
about future UK gas demand and emissions 
have certain expectations about the availability 
of CCS and the room for unabated gas-fired 
power generation.
• There is a need to consider the impact of 
climate-policy induced gas demand destruction 
– particularly in the household and industrial 
sectors – on the integrity and commercial 
viability of the UK’s gas supply chain. 
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Finally, there is a tendency to ignore the 
consequences of the low carbon energy transition 
for the incumbent fossil fuel sectors and this 
seems true of the gas sector in the UK. While it is 
recognised by politicians that gas has an important 
role to play in the UK’s future energy mix, too 
often it is relegated to a default position and there 
is a degree of complacency and an assumption 
that secure and affordable supplies will always be 
available should they be needed.
We would advocate a ‘gas by design’ policy that 
plans now for the changing role of gas in the UK 
energy mix, thus ensuring future UK gas security. 
A blind belief that a future UK shale gas revolution 
will solve all our problems does not fit with this 
remit. It seems highly likely that the UK will end 
up needing more gas for longer than current 
policy predicts and a failure now to pay sufficient 
attention to the issues that influence UK gas 
security will mean that consumers may end up 
paying more to secure that gas.
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